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1. I am an Executive Vice President of Compass Lexecon, a consulting firm that 
specializes in the application of economics to a variety of legal and regulatory issues.  I am a 
Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”) and regularly serve as a consulting or testifying expert in 
valuation and damages matters. 
2. I have testified in or directed litigation matters regarding securities fraud, 
accounting misstatements, business valuation (including appraisal cases), mergers and 
acquisitions disputes, bankruptcy, shareholder/management fraud and self-dealing, punitive 
damages, NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes, and general damages issues.  I have testified and been 
accepted as an expert in accounting and valuation matters (including appraisal cases) before the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, the Illinois state courts, and various federal courts.  I have also 
testified before American Arbitration Association and NAFTA arbitration panels.  My resume is 
attached as Appendix A to this expert report. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
3. Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company (formerly Aruba Networks, Inc.) 
(“Aruba”), a leader in the enterprise wireless local area networking (“WLAN”) industry, 
develops, markets, and sells products and services that help to satisfy its customers’ secure 
mobility needs.
1
  As Dominic Orr, Aruba’s CEO explained Aruba’s business “We let you cut 
that Ethernet cord from your PC and laptop and take your work and work at Starbucks, work 
from your kitchen, and yet with the security as if you’re still sit[ting] . . . at the desk.”
2
 
                                                          
1.  Aruba Networks, Inc. Schedule 14A, April 3, 2015 (“Aruba Proxy”), p. 1. 
2.  Deposition Transcript of Dominic Orr in In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
C.A. No. 10765-VCL (the “Orr Class Action Deposition”), at p. 16. 
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4. On March 2, 2015, Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”)3 and Aruba announced a 
definitive agreement (the “Merger Agreement”) for HP to acquire Aruba for $24.67 per share in 
cash (the “Merger Consideration”) (the “Transaction”).
4




5. On April 29, 2015, Verition Partners Master Fund LTD. and Verition Multi-
Strategy Fund LTD. (collectively, “Verition” or “Petitioners”) asserted their appraisal rights 
pursuant to Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) with respect to 
418,586 and 1,869,648 shares of Aruba common stock beneficially owned by the Master Fund 
and Multi-Strategy Fund, respectively.
6
  I understand that Aruba received additional demands for 




III. ASSIGNMENT AND SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 
6. I have been asked by counsel for Respondent to opine on the “fair value,” as the 
term is used in Section 262 of the DGCL, of Aruba common stock as of May 18, 2015 
                                                          
3.  On November 1, 2015, Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company (“HPE”), HP’s former 
enterprise technology infrastructure, software, services and financing businesses, was 
created through a separation from HP (the “Separation”).  HP Form 10-K for the Fiscal 
Year Ending October 31, 2015, p. 4.  In connection with the Separation, HP changed its 
name to HP Inc. (“HPI”).  Id.  It was HP that acquired Aruba pursuant to a merger 
agreement announced on March 2, 2015.  The merger closed on May 18, 2015, and the 
former Aruba business became part of HPE in the Separation. Id., p. 146. 
4.  Aruba Form 8-K, March 2, 2015, Ex-99.1 (HP News Release, HP to Acquire Aruba 
Networks to Create an Industry Leader in Enterprise Mobility). 
5. Aruba Form 8-K, May 18, 2015. 
6.  Petition for Appraisal of Stock filed August 28, 2015 (VERITION-00001508-13). 
7. May 28, 2015 letter from Marc Sonnenfeld to Josh Goldstein (VERITION-00001497).  
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  Section 262 of the DGCL states that the court should “determine the fair 
value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger or consolidation” and that in determining fair value, “shall take into 
account all relevant factors.” 
7. I have concluded that the fair value of Aruba as of the Valuation Date was $19.85 
per share.  I base this opinion on the materials reviewed and the analyses performed and 
detailed below.  I calculate the fair value of a share of Aruba based on a two-stage discounted 
cash flow (“DCF”) model, and also perform numerous other analyses and calculations, all of 
which corroborate the reasonableness of my fair value conclusion. 
8. This expert report sets forth the results of my analyses, my opinions and the 
supporting evidence.  Appendix B lists the documents I have relied upon in performing my 
analyses and reaching my opinions.  I have been assisted in my work by a team of professionals 
at Compass Lexecon working under my direct supervision.
9
  My compensation and the 
compensation received by Compass Lexecon are not contingent on the outcome of this litigation.  
I reserve the right to modify or supplement my analyses and conclusions should additional 
evidence become available. 
 
 
                                                          
8. Pursuant to Section 262, “the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of 
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or 
consolidation… In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all 
relevant factors.”  8 DEL. C. § 262(h). 
9. Compass Lexecon is being compensated for its professional services at its standard rates.  
My standard rate is $900 per hour, while those of my colleagues range from $210 - $820 
per hour. 
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IV. BACKGROUND  
A. WLAN Industry 
9. Aruba operated in the enterprise wireless local area network (“WLAN”) 
industry.
10
  The enterprise WLAN market consists of vendors primarily selling to organizations 
while the consumer WLAN market consists of vendors primarily selling directly to end users. 
According to the International Data Corporation (“IDC”), an international strategy and 
management consulting firm, the global enterprise WLAN market grew at a compound annual 
growth rate (“CAGR”) of 17.05 percent from 2008 to 2014.
11
  The WLAN market was expected 
to grow at a CAGR of 7 percent from 2015 to 2019.
12
  However, in the first quarter of 2015, 




10. The enterprise WLAN market is highly competitive.  According to IDC, as of the 
fourth quarter of 2014, the top five vendors accounted for approximately 74 percent of the 
enterprise WLAN market.  Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”) was by far the dominant player with 
approximately 48.4 percent market share, followed by Aruba with 11.8 percent, Ruckus 
                                                          
10.  A WLAN is a flexible data communications system that can use either infrared or radio 
frequencies to transmit and receive information over the air. Feng, Pan. “Wireless LAN 
Security Issues and Solutions”, 2012 IEEE Symposium on Robotics and Applications, p.3. 
A WLAN consists of two basic components; access points and network interface cards.  
Access points are the hub of the WLAN and exchange information with other wireless 
devices by means of an antenna working within a specific frequency spectrum. The 
network interface card scans the available frequency spectrum and associates it to the 
access point. Id. 
11. IDC WW WLAN Tracker_FinalHistoricalPivot_2014Q4_Aruba.xlsx. 
12. Wireless LAN Report, Five Year Forecast 2015 – 2019, Dell’Oro Group, January 2015, p. 
1 (ArubaAA0196131-59 at 35). 
13. “Worldwide WLAN Market Shows Slowed Growth in First Quarter of 2015” IDC, May 
28, 2015. 
JX 666 - p. 6 of 120
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
5 
 
Wireless, Inc. (“Ruckus”) with 6.2 percent, HP with 4.3 percent, and Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. 
(“Ubiquiti”) with 3.3 percent.  Aerohive Networks (“Aerohive) had a 2.1 percent market share as 
of the fourth quarter of 2014.
14
  
11. WLAN vendors have been able to report consistent growth in revenue quarter 
after quarter, but operating profits have been a different story.  Despite promises of operating 
leverage over the long-term, the “pure-play” or “standalone” wireless vendors like Aruba, 
Ruckus and Aerohive, have had a difficult time delivering on that promise.  This stands in 
contrast to vendors, like Cisco, who could offer both wireless and wired solutions.  A June 2014 
Deutsche Bank report on the WLAN market observed: 
In the WLAN space, we question whether there is room for both the number of players 
and on the whole, profitability. Each standalone WLAN has promised over the long 
term, their respective business model had leverage. And while some of these companies 
commanded significant gross margins, upwards of 70 percent in some cases, they are 
still unable to expand their operating margin despite promising the opposite. In the 
recent past, each of these companies has relied less on competitive differentiation and 
more on the traditional sales techniques to boost the top line. We believe this does little 




12. The difficulties faced by the standalone wireless vendors are evidenced by the 
consolidation in the industry both before and after the Transaction.  In its 2015 WLAN 
Infrastructure Vendor Scorecard, Matthias Machowinski, research director for enterprise 
networks and video at the consulting company IHS, Inc., states: 
Consolidation in the WLAN market has bifurcated the vendor landscape into end-to-end 
networking providers that can address the whole range of enterprise networking 
requirements, such as Cisco and HP, and WLAN specialists like Aerohive, Ruckus and 
Zebra that focus on a particular niche or new ways of solving old problems. 
 
                                                          
14.  IDC WW WLAN Tracker_FinalHistoricalPivot_2014Q4_Aruba.xlsx. 
15.  “The WLAN Market, Food Fight!” Deutsche Bank, June 29, 2014, p.1 (ArubaAA0449205-
16 at 05). 
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Specialists drive innovation, but once their period of hyper growth is over, they must 
have a long-term plan to compete against much larger and entrenched vendors. 
Meanwhile, end-to-end networking providers can leverage the completeness of their 
portfolio and their installed base, but they cannot become complacent in their success—




Mr. Machowski’s assessment of the WLAN industry is corroborated by transactions that have 
occurred in the WLAN industry.  Following the announcement of HP’s acquisition of Aruba, 
Aerohive, another ‘pure play’ WLAN vendor rumored to be a potential acquisition target, 
announced that Dell would begin reselling its WLAN and related management products.
17
  Some 
industry executives considered the Dell/Aerohive partnership to be a precursor to a potential 
acquisition.
18
  In addition, Fortinet announced that it was acquiring Meru Networks in May 2015 
and Brocade announced that it was acquiring Ruckus Wireless in April 2016.
19
  Acquisitions in 
the WLAN space that preceded HP’s acquisition of Aruba include Cisco’s acquisition of Meraki 
in November 2012 and Zebra Technologies’ acquisition of Motorola Solutions’ enterprise 
business in April 2014.
20
 
13. The continued consolidation of the WLAN industry suggests that few of the 
‘niche’ WLAN vendors believed they could continue to operate on a standalone basis and still be 
competitive with the end-to-end networking providers. 
                                                          
16.  WLAN Infrastructure Vendor Scorecard, Infonetics Research, July 6, 2015, p. 2 
(ArubaAA0334968-91 at 73). 
17. “HP buys Aruba and next thing you know Dell is reselling Aerohive WiFi Gear.” Network 
World, April 27, 2015. Web. 
18.  “Dell Aerohive Partnership ‘Smells’ Like an Acquisition Ahead, Partners Say.” CRN, 
April 28, 2016. Web. 
19.  Meru Networks, Inc. Form 8-K, May 27, 2015; Ruckus Wireless Inc. Form 8-K, April 3, 
2016. 
20. “Cisco Buying Meraki for $1.2 Billion for WiFi Networking.” Bloomberg, November 19, 
2012; Motorola Solutions, Inc. Form 8-K, April 14, 2014.  
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B. Aruba Networks 
14. Aruba was founded in 2002 by Keerti Melkote and Pankaj Manglik.21  At the time 
of the Transaction, Aruba was the second largest participant in the enterprise WLAN market.  
Aruba’s total revenue grew at a CAGR of 26.5 percent from $178.3 million in FY 2008 to 
$728.9 million in FY 2014.
22
  Over that same time period, Aruba’s share of the global enterprise 
WLAN market grew from approximately 7 percent to 11.7 percent.
23
  However, despite its 
number two position in the industry and its ability to consistently grow revenue quarter after 
quarter, Aruba faced a number of significant challenges at the time of the transaction. 
Aruba Faced Significant Competition from Cisco 
15. In order to fuel revenue growth, Aruba had to make sizable investments in 
research and development (“R&D”) as well as sales and marketing (“S&M”).  This made 
competing with Cisco, the enterprise WLAN market leader, extremely challenging as Cisco 
could bundle its wired and wireless products and lower its cost to acquire customers.  In addition, 
Cisco’s breadth of products allowed it to offer the customer a more complete solution.  Dan 
Warmenhoven, Aruba’s lead independent director, testified about the difficulties associated with 
the size of Aruba’s product line relative to Cisco’s: 
I think the board had a pretty good sense of the challenges facing the company and the 
implications of trying to continue as a standalone. There were a number of factors that 
would have really made it very difficult for Aruba to be successful in the long-term. 
 
The product line was too narrow to offer a complete value proposition to customers. The 
level of investment required to broaden the product line was beyond the capability of the 
company to invest. 
                                                          
21.  “Competition in 802.11ac Remains Fierce.” Janney Capital Markets, May 23, 2014, p. 2 
(ArubaAA0552027-34 at 28). 
22.  Aruba Form 10-Ks for the Fiscal Years Ending 2008 to 2014. 
23. IDC WW WLAN Tracker_FinalHistoricalPivot_2014Q4_Aruba.xlsx. 
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Cisco had a 50 percent market share, and having a complete product line was a major 




Mr. Warmenhoven also indicated that Cisco’s breadth of products allowed it to be more 
competitive on price: 
And the competition from Cisco was heating up. Remember, I said most customers were 
starting to think of Wi-Fi purchases not as a stand-alone purchase, but as an extension to 
their overall infrastructure. And in a bundled transaction like this, Cisco has enormous 
economic power with the customer. They could discount the Wi-Fi much deeper and 





Impact of SBC and Restructuring on Aruba’s Operating Leverage 
 
16. Despite robust growth in revenue, more than tripling from 2008 to 2014, Aruba’s 
operating income over that same period has remained flat.  This lack of operating leverage is 
illustrated in Exhibits 1A-B.   
17. And while companies like Aruba also report a non-GAAP operating income 
figure that adds back stock-based compensation (“SBC”) expense, that metric distorts reality as 
SBC represents a true and substantial economic cost for a company like Aruba.  In fact, Aruba’s 
stock-based compensation expense was closely watched by analysts and was recognized as too 
high.  For example, a March 13, 2014 RBC report noted: 
Taking cognizance of its admittedly high stock-based compensation structure, something 
we highlighted in our “Mind the Gap” report last year, Aruba's now committed to reduce 




Similarly, a February 27, 2015 Morgan Stanley report noted: 
                                                          
24. Deposition of Dan Warmenhoven (“Warmenhoven Deposition”), pp. 153-154.  
25. Warmenhoven Deposition, p. 119.   
26.  “Owning the Air, Looking for Consistency.” RBC Capital Markets, March 13, 2014, p. 1 
(ArubaAA0549208-15 at 08). 
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Our conversations with investors suggest high SBC is a notable sticking point for the 
stock, and as the company continues to trim stock awards and its share repurchase 
program becomes a more meaningful avenue of capital return we expect the market to 




18. Indeed, Aruba’s SBC expense has been significantly higher than its competitors 
over the five years prior to the transaction.  Figure 1 plots SBC expense as a percentage of 
revenue for Aruba and its peers. 
 
Figure 1 very clearly illustrates that Aruba’s SBC expense as a percent of revenue has been 
significantly higher than its peer group over the five years prior to the deal.  Aruba’s SBC as a 
percent of revenue was approximately 12 percent in 2009, 14 percent in 2010, and then hovered 
around 16 percent from 2011 to 2013 before retreating slightly to 15 percent in 2014.  No other 
peer comes close to even broaching the double digit mark in terms of SBC as a percentage of 
revenue.   
19. Aruba recognized that its historically high level of SBC created issues for the 
                                                          
27. “Coping Well with K-12 Purchase Delays; HP Matters Most.” Morgan Stanley, February 











2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Figure 1 
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company.  Michael Galvin, Aruba’s CFO testified regarding Aruba’s SBC expense being twice 
as high as its peers: 
Okay. And I did have charts that several sell-side analysts gave to me which -- with us 
being in the mid to high teens of SBC expenses as a percent of our revenue. Very much 





20. Acknowledging that its SBC expense was too high, Aruba planned to reduce its 
SBC to 12-14 percent of revenue in FY2015 and even further in subsequent years.
29
  Aruba’s 
high SBC expense, as well the company’s efforts to reduce that expense were highlighted by 
management during earnings calls.  For example, during the Q4 2014 earnings call, Mr. Galvin 
stated: 
 Next, I would like to comment on our stock-based compensation, or SBC. As I have 
discussed in previous quarters, we have implemented changes over the past year in our 
stock issuance practices. Our goal is to both reduce our SBC as a percentage of revenue 
as well as to moderate our stock dilution. In fiscal years ‘12 and ‘13, we had SBC of 16 
percent of revenues in each year. In our last 2 fiscal quarters, we have begun to see the 
benefits of the changes in our issuance practices, reporting SBC as a percentage of 
revenue of 15 percent in Q3 and 13 percent in this Q4. These actions brought our full 
fiscal ‘14 SBC down to 15 percent of revenue.
30 
 
21. Even with this reduction in SBC, Aruba’s SBC as a percentage of revenue was 
still significantly higher than that of its peers. 
Aruba Implements a Restructuring Plan 
22. In an attempt to address its profitability issues, on August 26, 2014 during the Q4 
2014 earnings call, Aruba announced a minor restructuring to increase its focus on “increasing 
                                                          
28. Deposition of Michael Galvin (“Galvin Deposition”), p. 133.  
29.  Aruba FQ4 2014 Earnings Call Transcript, August 26, 2014, p. 4 (ArubaAA0341667-83 at 
71). 
30. Id. (emphasis added). 
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  Commenting on the restructuring effort, Dominic Orr, Aruba’s CEO 
stated: 
We believe now is the right time to refine our operating structure in order to achieve that 
goal. Based on extensive analysis, we have identified opportunities to optimize our cost 
structure by eliminating certain positions as well as shifting others to administrative 




Mr. Galvin provided additional detail on the Aruba’s efforts to optimize its cost structure: 
 [W]e will reduce approximately 4 percent of our workforce. The reduction in force takes 
effect this quarter, and the relocation of jobs will take place largely over the first half of 




23. Aruba’s announcement was generally well received by analysts, particularly those 
that had been disappointed with the company’s inability to translate revenue growth into profits.  
In an August 27, 2014 report, Barclay’s analyst wrote that Aruba’s commitment to increase 
operating leverage was a “welcome surprise[]” and that the focus on leverage “will be well 
received by investors.”
34
  Similarly, Buckingham Research Group’s analyst indicated that “the 
restructuring actions are a positive and could eventually deliver upside to estimates as the 
company continues to drive top line growth.”
35
 
24. However, one analyst acknowledged that the announcement suggested serious 
concerns for the future of the WLAN industry: 
We cannot ignore the restructuring and what it portends for the overall WLAN 
– in short, it is a challenging market and in order to exhibit leverage it must come in the 
                                                          
31. Id., p. 9. 
32. Id., p. 3.  
33. Id., p. 5 
34. “Top Line Momentum Continues; Focusing More on Leverage.” Barclays, August 27, 
2014, p. 1. (ArubaAA0453223-34 at 23). 
35. “Clean Beat, Restructuring a Positive as Share Gains Continue.” Buckingham Research 
Group, August 27, 2014, p. 1. (ArubaAA0533219-35 at 19). 
JX 666 - p. 13 of 120
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
12 
 




Why is management cutting costs and shifting jobs overseas if the long term model 
never had an issue with profitability according to management? We believe it did. In a 
recent S2N (S2N #506 Food Fight!) we noted how difficult it was to generate profit in 
this sector given the competition. Now the company must lower its relative cost basis in 
order to deliver profitability. So while we appreciate the top-line numbers this quarter, 





25. The four percent workforce reduction at Aruba was also reported to have created 
an internal morale issue at the company.  In a December 23, 2014 report, JMP Securities’ analyst 
noted: 
Over the last year, Aruba has made significant changes in its sales organization in an 
effort to optimize costs, such as cutting jobs in sales support functions and lowering 
overall compensation for sales representatives. While we view the cost-optimization 
plans favorably, our checks suggest the changes have affected morale. Notably, our 
conversations indicate that at least a few sales reps have left or are planning to leave the 




Aruba’s Bookings Decline Prior to the Transaction 
 
26.  Unfortunately, around the same time Aruba started to focus on its cost structure, 
its bookings began to soften.  As the company strove to meet its revenue targets, its backlog was 
depleted.  Mr. Galvin explained what bookings are at his deposition: 
So bookings are…valid orders… that ultimately can become revenue for the company. 




Mr. Galvin went on to explain the importance of bookings to Aruba’s business: 
The bookings are -- the bookings are what drive the business. That is the metric -- that’s 
                                                          
36. “FY Q4 Results.” Deutsche Bank, August 27, 2014, p. 1. (ArubaAA0453282-9 at 2). 
37.  “VP of North America Sales Resigns.” JMP Securities, December 23, 2014, p. 2. 
(ArubaAA0108732-9 at 3) 
38. Galvin Deposition, p. 24.  
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the leading indicator of what revenue is coming down the road. So bookings absolutely 
[are] the pulse of the business and what drives it.  After that, you figure out when can it 




Mr. Galvin further explained that backlog is a measure of bookings that have not been converted 
to revenues by the end of the period, and that Aruba closely evaluated its quarterly bookings and 
backlog in forecasting revenue: 
And so we very closely looked at and tracked what were known as “weeks of backlog,” 
and that was -- you would have a certain amount of what we called “weeks of backlog” 
entering quarters to -- you know, in a sense, it was kind of a bank account of what work 
-- what prior bookings had the potential of becoming revenue within a quarter. 
 
Definitely portions, and then there was a layer backlog, that usually could never become 
revenue in the next quarter, but that was -- so I guess it would be bookings, as the 
leading indicator, and then an evaluation of backlog to say, you know, is the backlog in 
an appropriate, healthy enough state to where we believe we can get revenue conversion 




27. Aruba’s generated backlog turned negative in the first quarter of 2015 and the 
book-to-bill ratio (a measure that divides bookings by revenue) dropped below 1 for the first 
time in seven quarters.
41
  A book-to-bill ratio greater than 1 indicates that more orders were 
received than filled, indicating stronger demand, while a ratio below 1 implies weaker demand.  
Exhibit 2 presents Aruba’s quarterly bookings and generated backlog information from January 
2013 to January 2015.  The exhibit shows that Aruba’s book-to-bill ratio remained below 1.0 for 
the second quarter of 2015 as well, falling to 0.96 from 0.97 in the first quarter of 2015 as the 
backlog decreased from -$7.2 million to -$8.9 million. 
28. Mr. Galvin testified that Aruba missed the bookings targets in Aruba’s plan for 
multiple quarters prior to the transaction: 
                                                          
39. Galvin Deposition, p. 26. 
40. Galvin Deposition, p. 28. 
41. Aspen – Discussion Exhibits (3).xlsx, p. 4. (ArubaAA0466129-49 at 32). 
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We missed the July 31st bookings number. We missed the October 31st bookings 
number. And we missed the January 31st bookings number. And the accumulative of 
those totals was we had missed by $46 million over the three quarters. 
 
So we were 46 in the hole from a planning standpoint, which is obviously a substantive 
number.  The backlog was, you know, bone dry in terms of revenue; revenue was the 




Mr. Galvin further testified that, because they missed their internal bookings targets, the 
company had to dip into its backlog to make its revenue guidance: 
 At this point, as of the end of Q1 '15, we had missed our internal bookings numbers two 
quarters in a row. So we were -- let me check the math.  
 
I believe the last two quarters now we were 19 million under our bookings plans for the 
last two quarters. So we had dug into our bank account and started to pull backlog lower 
than our historical levels at this point. 
 
So we were dealing with a smaller bank account than we would have liked to have been. 




Q. But, in fact, you hit the guidance? 
 





29. Exhibit 3 presents the bookings estimates for Q3 2014 and Q4 2014 contained in 
Aruba’s 2H’ 2014 plan, the bookings estimates for Q1 2015 and Q2 2015 contained in Aruba’s 
1H’ 2015 plan, and the actual bookings figures in each of those four quarters.  As the exhibit 
indicates, Aruba missed its bookings estimates by $1.9 million in Q3 2014, $14.7 million in Q4 
2014, $4.4 million in Q1 2015, and $26.9 million in Q2 2015.  All told, as of January 31, 2015 
Aruba was actually $48 million in the hole from a planned bookings standpoint. 
                                                          
42. Galvin Deposition, p. 290. 
43.  Id., pp. 235, 251. 
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30. With bookings $48 million below plan as of January 31, 2015 and its backlog 
depleted, Aruba revised its projections downward in February 2015.  Mr. Galvin testified 
regarding the decision to revise the projections: 
So we were 46 in the hole from a planning standpoint, which is obviously a substantive 
number.  The backlog was, you know, bone dry in terms of revenue; revenue was the 
lowest it had ever been in the company's history. 
 
So it would have been anything but – it would have been completely imprudent to not 




Impending Departure of CEO 
31. In addition to the challenges described above, Aruba was also facing the 
impending departure of its CEO.  Mr. Warmenhoven described Mr. Orr as “the cornerstone of 
the entire company” and “the face to the customers, the face to the partners, and the face to the 
employees.”
45
  On Aruba’s prospects without Mr. Orr, Mr. Warmenhoven commented, “we had 
the prospect [of a] company facing a much more difficult market and having no leader.  Not a 
good combo.”
46
  Mr. Warmenhoven also testified about how the Board factored Mr. Orr’s 
retirement plans into its assessment of Aruba’s standalone prospects: 
But at the end of this discussion, after the financial advisors had left the room, there was 
a director-only discussion about risks associated with the execution without Dominic. 
Not only was the market contracting or changing, but we were going to be without our 
iconic leader, the founder, CEO, who everybody identified as the face of the company, 
and that brought enough execution risk associated with it that we concluded that -- and 
Mr. Galvin did not know about Mr. Orr's decision to retire. 
 
So Mike did not have any of that wrapped into his financial projections, appropriately 
so.  But the board was aware, and, therefore, we felt that we should treat this as 
optimistic because there would no doubt be difficulty in a CEO transition in sustaining 
                                                          
44. Galvin Deposition, p. 290.  
45.  Warmenhoven Deposition, p. 154. 
46.  Id. 
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Overall, Aruba Faced Multiple Serious Challenges at the Time of the Transaction 
32. Taken together, the challenges facing Aruba at the time of the Transaction 
reflected a perfect storm for the company.  The competitive dynamics of the WLAN industry and 
competition from Cisco, in particular, was making it very difficult for Aruba to compete on 
product breadth and price.  Aruba had to significantly reduce its SBC expense as that was 
negatively perceived by analysts and investors and its restructuring plan had created a morale 
issue at the company.  Aruba’s efforts to convert its topline revenue growth to operating income 
were further side-tracked when bookings began to falter.  Finally, the pending departure of its 
CEO further undermined the company’s long term prospects as a standalone entity.  Mr. 
Warmenhoven summarized the difficult position Aruba was in: 
I think we all have a pretty good appreciation of the strategic issues the company faced 
in competing with Cisco and getting out-invested and outsold in terms of bundling 
products.  And if this deal didn’t go through, we knew there was no other alternative for 
acquisition, and if it didn’t go through we would start the CEO search the next day. 
 





Other Aspects of Aruba’s Standalone Business Plan 
33. In addition to reducing its SBC expense and restructuring its workforce, Aruba’s 
standalone business plan also included a share repurchase plan as well as a potential convertible 
debt offering. 
34. At the time of the Transaction, the Aruba Board had authorized a stock repurchase 
                                                          
47. Id., pp. 184-185. 
48. Warmenhoven Deposition, p. 168.  
JX 666 - p. 18 of 120
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
17 
 
program for an aggregate amount of up to $500 million.
49
  Aruba repurchased 5.3 million shares 
for a total purchase price of $86.2 million during fiscal 2013, 14.7 million shares for a total 
purchase price of $263 million during fiscal 2014, and 5.3 million shares for a total purchase 
price of $105 million during the first half of fiscal 2015.
50
  According to Mr. Galvin, the basic 
motive of Aruba’s stock buyback plan was to negate dilution.
51
 
35. Aruba had also contemplated a convertible debt offering prior to the Transaction.  
The purpose of the potential convertible debt offering was (1) to shore up Aruba’s balance sheet 
as it had spent a significant portion of its cash repurchasing shares and (2) to fund future cash 
M&A activity.
52
  Aruba did not complete the convertible debt offering because HP approached 
the Company about a possible transaction before they had come to a final decision on whether to 
move forward with the offering.
53
 
V. SALES PROCESS 
36. On August 27, 2014, Antonio Neri, Senior Vice President and General Manager, 
HP Servers and HP Networking Global Business Units, contacted Mr. Orr and indicated that HP 
was interested in discussing a possible acquisition of Aruba.
54
   
37. On September 5, 2014, Aruba engaged Qatalyst Partners as its financial advisor in 
                                                          
49.  Aruba Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ending July 31, 2014, p. 38. 
50.  Id.; Aruba Form 10-Q for the Quarter Ending January 31, 2015, p. 20. 
51.  Galvin Deposition, p. 33. 
52.  Galvin Deposition, pp. 101-102. 
53.  Galvin Deposition, pp. 109-111. 
54. Aruba Proxy, p. 39.  
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connection with a potential transaction with HP.
55
 
38. On September 10, 2014, representatives of Qatalyst Partners met with the Aruba 
Board to discuss background financial information on the company and possible next steps.  The 
Qatalyst Partners representatives also discussed third parties that might have the interest and 
capability to consider a transaction with Aruba.
56
 
39. On September 25, 2014, the Board met with senior executives of the company as 
well as representatives from Qatalyst Partners.  At that meeting, the Board directed Qatalyst 
Partners to reach out to a select group of potential strategic acquirers that had both the financial 
wherewithal to pursue a transaction and a strategic interest in mobile technology, and could thus 
bid competitively against HP.  The Board determined not to contact any potential financial 
buyers as the volatility of Aruba’s cash flow and the lack of synergies in such a transaction 
would make it difficult for those firms to bid competitively against HP.
57
  
40. Between September 29, 2014 and October 2, 2014, representatives of Qatalyst 
Partners contacted senior executives at five potential strategic acquirers: Oracle, EMC, IBM, 
Google and Samsung.
58
 All five companies contacted by Qatalyst Partners declined to engage in 
evaluating a potential acquisition of Aruba.
59
  The reasons given by the potential strategic 
acquirers for why they were declining to engage varied.  For example, Google responded that if 
they really wanted that technology, they would build it themselves while IBM indicated that they 
                                                          
55. Id.  
56  Id. 
57  Aruba Proxy, p. 40. 
58.  Deposition of George Boutros (“Boutros Deposition”), p. 219; Respondents’ Responses 
and Objections to Petitioners’ First Interrogatories, p. 9. 
59. Aruba Proxy, pp. 40-41.  
JX 666 - p. 20 of 120
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
19 
 
were exiting the hardware business altogether.
60
  In addition, Dominic Orr, Aruba’s CEO, 
personally reached out to Google Access and Dell.
61
   
41. On October 2, 2014, management teams from Aruba and HP met in person to 
discuss the potential strategic transaction.  At that meeting, Aruba’s management made a 
presentation to the HP executives that included, among other things, financial projections 
prepared by Aruba management and potential synergies that could result from the transaction.
62
 
42. On November 20, 2014, Aruba announced its financial results for the first quarter 




43. On November 24, 2014, Mr. Neri informed Mr. Orr that HP’s board wanted HP’s 
management to prepare additional financial analyses regarding the proposed transaction and that 
HP would require an additional two to three weeks to address the Board’s questions.  
After internal discussion, Aruba determined that it would suspend discussions with HP.
64
 
44. On January 21, 2015, Messrs. Orr and Neri had a dinner meeting with Meg 
Whitman during which discussions regarding a strategic transaction were reopened.
65
 
45. On January 30, 2015, representatives of Qatalyst Partners contacted a senior 
executive at another potential strategic acquirer – Citrix – to assess its interest in a potential 
                                                          
60.  Warmenhoven Deposition, p. 101. 
61. Deposition of Dominic Orr (“Orr Deposition), pp. 175-8.  
62.  Aruba Proxy, p. 40. 
63.  Aruba Proxy, p. 41. 
64.  Aruba Proxy, p. 42. 
65.  Id. 
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  Three days later, Citrix informed Qatalyst Partners that it was declining 
to engage in evaluating an acquisition of Aruba.
67
  Qatalyst did not, at this point, recanvas the 
original strategic acquirers they had approached as the reasons they had given for declining to 
engage in evaluating an acquisition of Aruba were related to strategic fit rather than price.
68
 
46. On January 31, 2015, Aruba received a non-binding proposal from HP to acquire 
the company for $23.25 per share in cash.
69
 
47. On February 1, 2015 Aruba retained Evercore as an additional financial advisor in 
connection with its discussions with HP.
70
 
48. On February 2, 2015, at a special meeting of the Aruba Board attended by 
Aruba’s financial and legal advisors, Mr. Galvin provided a preliminary review of Aruba’s 




49. On February 4, 2015 the Aruba Board met with its legal and financial advisors to 
discuss HP’s January 31 proposal.  The Board authorized representatives of Evercore to present a 
counter-proposal to HP of $29.00 per share in cash.
72
 
50. On February 9, 2015, HP submitted a written proposal to acquire Aruba for 
$24.67 per share in cash and indicated that it was HP’s “best and final” offer.  HP further 
                                                          
66.  Aruba Proxy, p. 42; Respondents’ Responses and Objections to Petitioners’ First 
Interrogatories, p. 9. 
67.  Aruba Proxy, p. 43. 
68.  Boutros Deposition, pp. 219-220. 
69.  Aruba Proxy, p. 42. 
70.  Aruba Proxy, p. 43. 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
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indicated that there would be no financing or funding condition but that the offer was contingent 
upon the parties entering into a 30-day exclusivity agreement.
73
 
51. On February 10, 2015, the Aruba Board discussed the sales process undertaken by 
its financial advisors, in which all of the strategic acquirors that presented the strongest strategic 
fit with Aruba had declined to explore an acquisition transaction.  The Aruba Board also 
discussed the recent weakness in the Aruba’s stock price as well as the potential upside and risks 
of successfully executing on its standalone strategy.  The Aruba Board also discussed whether to 
make a counter-offer to HP at $25.00 per share in light of the fact that HP had characterized its 
proposal as its “best and final” offer.  After discussion, the Board concluded that $24.67 per 
share in cash was a compelling offer and authorized management to enter into an exclusivity 
agreement with HP and commence negotiations on that basis.
74
 
52. On February 25, 2015, Bloomberg Business reported that Aruba was in 
discussions with HP regarding a potential acquisition of Aruba by HP.  Aruba’s stock price 
closed at $22.24 on February 25, up 21 percent from its opening price of $18.38.
75
 
53. On March 1, 2015, the Aruba Board convened a special meeting to consider the 
terms of the proposed strategic transaction.  At the meeting, representatives of Qatalyst Partners 
reviewed its financial analyses of the consideration to be received by Aruba stockholders 
pursuant to the Merger Agreement, and delivered its oral opinion, subsequently confirmed in 
writing on March 1, 2015, that the $24.67 per share merger consideration to be received by the 
holders of Aruba common stock, other than HP or its affiliates, pursuant to the Merger 
                                                          
73.  Aruba Proxy, p. 44. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Aruba Proxy, p. 45; The Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”). 
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Agreement was fair, from a financial point of view, to such holders.
76
 
54. On March 2, 2015, Aruba and HP executed the Merger Agreement and issued a 
joint press release announcing the transaction.
77
 
VI. FAIR VALUE OF ARUBA 
55. I have been asked to opine on the “fair value,” as the term is used in Section 262 
of the DGCL, of Aruba common stock as of May 18, 2015 (the “Valuation Date”).
78
  Section 262 
of the DGCL states that the court should “determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation” 
and that in determining fair value, “shall take into account all relevant factors.” 
56. For the reasons more fully discussed below, I determine that the standalone fair 
value of Aruba is most accurately measured using a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis.  My 
DCF analysis of Aruba indicates a fair value of $19.85 per share.  Prior to discussing my DCF 
analysis, I first discuss other indications of fair value that I calculate and/or consider including: 
 the merger price (excluding any synergies);  
 the contemporaneous analyst price targets; 
 the various financial advisors’ valuations; 
 a comparable company analysis; and 
 a comparable transactions analysis. 
 
A. Merger Price (Excluding Any Synergies) 
57. One potential indicator of fair value is the merger price itself, particularly in 
                                                          
76.  Aruba Proxy, p. 45. 
77.  Id., p. 46. 
78. Pursuant to Section 262, “the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of 
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or 
consolidation… In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all 
relevant factors.”  8 DEL. C. § 262(h). 
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situations where the target company was acquired in an arms’ length transaction subject to a 
robust sales process.
79 
 However, in situations where the merger price includes a portion of the 
merger-specific synergies as opposed to solely the target’s value as a going concern, the portion 




58. Based on the record in this case, it appears that Qatalyst Partners conducted a 
robust sales process, and I have seen no evidence indicating that the transaction was not done at 
arms’ length.  Moreover, the record indicates that HP paid a portion of its estimate of the 
synergies to Aruba.   
59. As mentioned above, Qatalyst Partners and/or Dominic Orr contacted eight 
potential strategic acquirers and all eight declined to engage in even evaluating an acquisition of 
Aruba for strategic reasons.
81
  Qatalyst Partners did not contact potential financial buyers 
because the Board determined that financial buyers could not be competitive in their potential 
valuations.  The determination by the Board that potential financial buyers would not be as 
competitive in their valuations of Aruba was reasonable. 
60. Strategic buyers and financial buyers have different motivations for making 
acquisitions.  Strategic buyers acquire firms to supplement or complement existing operations 
while financial buyers generally acquire firms in order to operate the acquired company as an 
                                                          
79.  See, e.g., Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 
2013); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d, at *34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
Merion Capital LP and Merion Capital II LP v. BMC Software, Inc., at *2, 42-43 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 21, 2015). 
80.  See LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., Slip. Op. June 30, 2015, C.A. No. 
8094-VCP (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015), p. 67. 
81.  Warmenhoven Deposition, pp. 96-104. 
JX 666 - p. 25 of 120
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
24 
 
independent entity, pay down acquisition debt, and eventually resell it or take it public.
82
  The 
financial buyer’s primary concern is whether the company will generate enough cash flow to 
repay the purchase price and generate a profit.
83
  The strategic buyer, while certainly concerned 
with cash flows and profits, will also focus on the potential synergies that can be achieved by the 
acquisition.   
61. The different motivations and operative frameworks for strategic and financial 
buyers lead them to evaluate potential acquisitions using different valuation methods.  The 
internal rate of return (“IRR”) is the primary metric by which financial buyers asses a potential 
transaction.  Financial buyers typically target transactions with a 20 percent+ IRR.
84
  The 
primary drivers of the IRR are the purchase price, the financing structure (particularly the size of 
the equity component), the exit multiple, and the year of exit.  Therefore, given the cash flows of 
the business, the cost of debt financing, the amount the buyer is willing to commit in equity, and 
an assumed exit year/multiple, there is a cap on what a financial buyer can pay in order to 
generate a target IRR of 20 percent or greater.  The valuation implied by this type of framework 
tends to be at the lower end of the spectrum as compared to methodologies employed by strategic 
buyers like DCF and precedent transaction analysis.
85
  This largely due to the constraints 
imposed by the financial buyer’s target IRR.   
62. This Court has also recognized that a financial buyer’s willingness to pay is based 
on a model that is focused on achieving a targeted IRR rather than the fair value of the company. 
                                                          
82. Lajoux, Alexandra Reed and Stanley Foster Reed. The Art of M&A. McGraw-Hill, 1999, p. 
4. 
83. Id., p. 11.  
84. Pearl, Joshua and Joshua Rosenbaum. Investment Banking: Valuation, Leveraged Buyouts 
and Mergers & Acquisitions. Wiley, 2009. (“Investment Banking”), p. 172  
85.  Investment Banking, p. 236. 
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In its Memorandum Opinion, In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc., the Court illustrates the limitation of 
the financial buyer: 
Using the same set of projections for both a DCF analysis and an LBO analysis, 
JPMorgan showed why a financial sponsor would not be willing to pay an amount 
approaching the Company’s going-concern value. Using the September Case and a DCF 
analysis, JPMorgan valued the Company as a going concern at between $20 and $27 per 
share. But using the same projected cash flows in an LBO model, JPMorgan projected 
that a financial buyer’s willingness to pay would max out at approximately $14.13 per 
share, because at higher prices, the sponsor could not achieve a minimum return hurdle 
of a 20 percent IRR over five years.
86
   
 
The Court ultimately concluded: 
 
Taken as a whole, the foregoing evidence, along with other evidence in the record, 
establishes that the Original Merger Consideration was dictated by what a financial 
sponsor could pay and still generate outsized returns. This fact is a strong indication that 




63. In the case of HP’s acquisition of Aruba, we have the exact opposite situation. 
Qatalyst and/or Mr. Orr contacted eight strategic buyers, but contacted no financial buyers as the 
Board recognized that the financial buyers would be limited in what they would be willing to 
pay.
88
  With varying degrees of synergies available to the potential strategic acquirors, Qatalyst 
focused its efforts on the group of buyers likely to pay the most to acquire Aruba. 
64. HP’s approach to valuing Aruba illustrates this point.  Joakim Johansson, HP’s 
Vice President of Corporate Development, testified regarding how HP determined the amount it 
was willing to pay for Aruba: 
So we look at what’s the total value to us. We look at standalone value, which is our 
valuation of what we think the business can do by itself. And then we layer on top the 
                                                          
86.  In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc., Memorandum Opinion, May 31, 2016, p. 65. 
87.  In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc., Memorandum Opinion, May 31, 2016, p. 69 (emphasis 
added). 
88.  Warmenhoven Deposition, pp. 91-92. 
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If you look at our total strategic valuation, I’m going off memory, but I think it was 3 
and a half, 3.6. [billion] So we were literally paying away -- and we understand [Aruba’s 
stand alone] value pegged at 1 -- $2 billion. So we are literally paying away $1 billion of 




65. In the absence of specific record evidence of the amount of synergies included in 
the merger price, one may look to contemporaneous estimates of the target’s standalone value 
created by the buyer as potential baselines to infer the level of synergies paid.  HP internally 
valued Aruba using a DCF analysis on a standalone basis at $2 billion and valued the synergies 
at $1.410 billion including revenue synergies of $1.175 billion and cost synergies of $235 
million.
91
  HP’s synergy estimates were supported by market research and analyses performed by 
McKinsey.  McKinsey’s revenue synergy estimate was $1.260 billion and assumed a 3 percent 
market share gain in wired and a 7 percent market share gain in wireless and a 17.4 percent 
operating margin on the synergy revenue.
92
  McKinsey’s findings based, in part, on interviews 
and surveys with over 120 purchasing executives and channel partners suggested that the share 
gains, while aggressive, were feasible.
93
  McKinsey’s cost synergy estimate was $295 million 
assumed a 1 percent expansion in operating margins through the elimination of duplicative costs 
in S&M and R&D, and G&A.  McKinsey concluded that HP’s savings estimates were in line 
                                                          
89.  Deposition of Joakim Johansson (“Johansson Deposition”), Page 29. 
90.  Johansson Deposition, p. 110. 
91. Project Aspen, IRB Approval to Sign, February 28, 2015, pp. 7, 10 (ArubaAA0519872-917 
at 878, 881). 
92.  Project Aspen Discussion Document, December 2014, p. 2. (ArubaAA0337815-44 at 17).  
93. Id., p. 3. 
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66. HP’s financial advisor, Barclays, valued Aruba using a DCF analysis based on 
HP’s projections for the Aruba standalone business and its synergy estimates.  Exhibit 4A 
presents a replication of Barclay’s DCF analysis of Aruba with synergies.  Including synergies, 
Barclays valued Aruba at $3.0 to $4.5 billion ($27.51 to $39.71 per share) with a point estimate 
of $3.6 million ($32.30 per share).  Exhibit 4B takes the same analysis presented in Exhibit 4A 
and removes both the revenue and cost synergies (i.e., standalone value).  Excluding synergies, 
Barclays valued Aruba at $1.8 to $2.6 billion ($17.31 to $23.97 per share) with a point estimate 
of $2.1 billion ($19.93 per share).  Subtracting the values in Exhibit 4B from the values in 
Exhibit 4A indicates the synergies were valued by Barclays at $1.2 to $1.9 billion ($10.20 to 
$15.74 per share) with a point estimate of $1.5 billion ($12.37 per share).  Barclay’s analysis 
ascribes a similar value to the synergies ($1.5 billion). 
67. The actual transaction price of $24.67 implies an enterprise value of $2.651 
billion.
96
  Therefore, HP’s internal analysis indicates that HP paid $651 million more for Aruba 
than its $2 billion estimate of standalone enterprise value.  This suggests that HP paid 46.2 
percent of its $1.410 billion synergy estimate or 41.9 percent of McKinsey’s $1.555 billion 
synergy estimate to Aruba.  Similarly, Barclay’s analysis indicates that HP paid $551 more for 
Aruba than its $2.1 billion estimate of standalone enterprise value or 36.7 percent of its $1.5 
billion synergy estimate to Aruba. 
                                                          
94.  Id. 
95.   The difference between the McKinsey synergy estimate of $1.555 billion and HP’s $1.410 
estimate is a $155 million due diligence adjustment (see Project Aspen, IRB Approval to 
Sign, February 28, 2015, pp. 11 (ArubaAA0519872-917 at 882). 
96.  See Exhibit 9.  
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68. The percentage of synergies actually paid by HP to Aruba cannot be accurately 
measured.  It will vary depending on the assumptions made regarding the value of the synergies 
and the value of the standalone business.  However, a March 2013 study by the Boston 
Consulting Group (“BCG”) suggests that, on average, sellers collect 31 percent of the average 
capitalized value of the synergies although the seller’s share varies widely from 6 percent to 51 
percent.
97
  The shared synergy percentages implied by the DCF valuations performed by HP and 
Barclays are within the range observed by BCG.   
69. The fair value indications based on the merger price less shared synergies (i.e., 
standalone value) of $19.93 per share based on the Barclay’s analysis and $18.98 per share 
based on HP’s internal analysis both support my estimate of Aruba’s fair value.
98
 
B. Analyst Target Prices 
70. Another potential indication of standalone value is reflected in the 
contemporaneous price targets of equity analysts following the company prior to the 
announcement of the deal.  In the case of Aruba, the company was very well covered by Wall 
Street at the time of the Transaction.  Exhibit 5 presents the price targets set by sixteen different 
analysts following the report by Bloomberg on February 27, 2015 that HP and Aruba were 
discussing a possible transaction.  The exhibit also indicates the prior target for each analyst.  
The analysts’ price targets ranged from $19.00 per share to $29.00 per share with a median of 
$22.00 prior to the Bloomberg report and ranged from $20.00 per share to $34.00 per share 
with a median of $26.00 after the report.   
 
                                                          
97. “How Successful M&A Deal Split Synergies.” BCG Perspectives, March 27, 2013. Web. 
98. $2 billion / ($2.1 billion / $19.93 per share) = $18.98 per share. 
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C. Financial Advisors’ Valuations 
71. As discussed earlier, in connection with the Transaction, Aruba retained two 
financial advisors, Qatalyst Partners and Evercore, while HP retained Barclays as its sole 
financial advisor.  All three financial advisors analyzed Aruba’s value and presented or provided 
those findings to their respective clients.
99
  In the sections that follow, I briefly summarize the 
analyses performed by each of the three financial advisors. 
Qatalyst Partners 
72. As discussed above, on March 1, 2015 Qatalyst Partners delivered its opinion to 
the Aruba Board on March 1, 2015, that the $24.67 per share merger consideration to be received 
by the holders of Aruba common stock, other than HP or its affiliates, pursuant to the Merger 
Agreement was fair, from a financial point of view, to such holders.  The financial analyses 
performed by Qatalyst in support of its fairness opinion are summarized in a March 2015 
presentation (the “March 2015 Qatalyst Deck”).
100
 
73. The March 2015 Qatalyst Deck contains a DCF analysis of Aruba’s standalone 
value resulting in a value range of $20.85 to $30.02 per share with a midpoint value of $25.16 
per share.
101
  Qatalyst also performed a comparable company analysis and concluded a value 
range of $18.52 to $26.46 per share based on the Management Projections (see infra) and $17.23 
to $24.61 per share based on the Street Case (reflecting consensus analyst estimates as of 
February 27, 2015).  Lastly, Qatalyst performed a comparable transaction analysis using 
                                                          
99. Evercore shared their analysis but did not make a presentation to Aruba. (See Deposition of 
Jeff Reisenberg, pp. 111, 166). 
100.  Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for Discussion, March 2015 (ARUN000093-
130). 
101.  Qatalyst DCF range assumes a WACC of 10.5% to 14.0% and terminal NOPAT multiples 
of 11.0x to 16.0x. 
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enterprise value to revenue multiples and P/E multiples.  Qatalyst’s LTM revenue multiple 
analysis indicated a value range of $11.88 to $25.33 per share with a median of $19.40 per share 
and the NTM revenue multiple indicated a value range of $17.54 to $26.86 per share with a 
median of $20.80 per share.  Qatalyst’s LTM P/E multiple analysis indicated a value range of 
$18.34 to $25.26 per share with a median of $21.96 per share and the NTM P/E multiple 
indicated a value range of $23.21 to $34.91 per share with a median of $29.86.
102
  Figure 2 
presents the ranges per share for each of Qatalyst’s analyses and compares them to the $24.67 
merger price.  
 
74. Averaging the ranges indicated by the various financial analyses performed by 
Qatalyst results in a value range of $18.22 per share to $27.64 per share. 
Evercore 
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75. Evercore was retained by Aruba as an additional financial advisor on February 1, 
2015.  Although Evercore did not provide a fairness opinion they did perform valuation analyses.  
The financial analyses performed by Evercore are summarized in a March 1, 2015 presentation 
(the “March 1, 2015 Evercore Deck”).
103
 
76. The March 1, 2015 Evercore Deck contains a DCF analysis of Aruba’s standalone 
value resulting in a value range of $21.11 to $29.77 per share based on the perpetual growth rate 
(“PGR”) approach and $24.23 to $29.75 per share based on a terminal EBITDA multiple 
approach.
104
  Evercore performed a comparable company analysis and concluded a value range 
of $18.34 to $26.21 per share based on the Management Projections and $16.73 to $23.90 per 
share based on the Street Case.
105
  Evercore also performed a present value of future share price 
analysis and concluded a value range of $21.27 to $31.20 per share under the management plan 
and $16.96 to $24.88 under the per share Street case.  Lastly, Evercore performed a premiums 
paid analysis and concluded a value range of $20.68 to $25.17 per share based on the 1-week 
premium and $20.71 to $24.60 per share based on the 4-week premium.
106
  Figure 3 presents the 
ranges per share for each of Evercore’s analyses and compares them to the $24.67 merger price.   
                                                          
103.  Project Athens Supporting Valuation Analysis, March 1, 2015 (EVERCORE00011411-32). 
104.  Evercore’s DCF analysis assumes a WACC of 11% to 13% and a PGR of 4% to 5% (for 
PGR approach) and terminal EBITDA multiple of 9.0x to 11.0x (for multiple approach). 
105. Evercore makes two mistakes on page 6 of its March 1, 2015 presentation.  First, Evercore 
transposes the 1 and the 3 in the street case EPS figure and uses $1.31 rather than $1.13 to 
determine the value range.  Second, Evercore mislabels the value ranges for the 
management plan and street case.  I correct for both of these errors in the value ranges 
provided (see March 1, 2015 Evercore Deck, pp. 6, 15). 
106. Project Athens Supporting Valuation Analysis, March 1, 2015, p. 6.  
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77. Averaging the ranges indicated by the various financial analyses performed by 
Evercore results in a value range of $19.69 per share to $26.48 per share. 
Barclays 
78. Barclays was retained by HP as its financial advisor in connection with the 
Transaction.  The financial analyses performed by Barclays are summarized in a February 27, 
2015 presentation (the “February 27, 2015 Barclay’s Deck”).
107
 
79. The February 27, 2015 Barclay’s Deck contains a DCF analysis based on the 
Management Projections resulting in a value range of $28.20 to $33.64 per share and one based 
on the HP management case including synergies resulting in a value range of $27.53 to $39.69 
per share.
108
  The Barclays Deck also includes 9 comparable trading measures – 3 based on 
                                                          
107.  Project Aspen Board Materials, February 27, 2015 (ArubaAA0519962). 
108.  Barclay’s DCF based on Management Projections assumes a WACC of 11% to 13% and 
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revenue multiples, 3 based on EBITDAS (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & 
amortization, and stock based compensation) multiples, and 3 based on price to earnings 
multiples.  The value range indicated by these measures is $20.75 to $29.32 per share for the 
revenue multiples, $20.16 to $29.64 per share for the EBITDAS multiples, and $21.01 to $27.43 
per share for the price to earnings multiples.  Finally, Barclays performed a comparable 
transaction analysis that indicated a value range of $21.01 to $28.86 per share.
109
  Figure 4 
presents the ranges per share for each of Barclays’s analyses and compares them to the $24.67 
merger price.  
Figure 4 
Barclay’s Valuation Analyses 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
assumes a WACC of 11% to 13% and a PGR of 2% to 4%. 
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80. Averaging the ranges indicated by the various financial analyses performed by 
Barclays results in a value range of $22.66 per share to $28.41 per share.
110
 
D. Comparable Company Analysis 
81. Another commonly accepted valuation method calculates the value of the subject 
company based on its value relative to the trading multiples of comparable companies.  This 
valuation method involves identifying publicly traded companies that are sufficiently similar to 
the target company with respect to, for example, product lines, geographic reach of services, 
business risk, financial characteristics and/or growth prospects.  Usually that entails identifying 
companies in the subject entity’s same industry (i.e., its competitors) and calculating a multiple 
of that reference company’s value (e.g., enterprise value or equity market capitalization) relative 
to a measure of financial performance (e.g., EBITDA, earnings or revenues).  The subject 
entity’s value is then calculated by applying a representative multiple, or range of multiples, to 
the subject company’s historical or projected financial performance.  A trading multiples-based 
method estimates the value of the subject entity based on the market prices that other companies’ 
stock trades for under current market conditions (i.e., a minority interest valuation) as opposed to 
the value of acquiring an entire company (i.e., no minority discount).
111
   
82. I understand that the various parties that have valued Aruba have looked to a 
                                                          
110. The average of the Barclay’s range excluding the HP Case with Synergies is $22.28 per 
share to $27.55 per share.  
111.  As a result, some valuation professionals add a control premium to the resulting valuation 
range in order to compare with the offer received from a control buyer.  (See, e.g., Cornell, 
Bradford. Corporate Valuation, Business One Irwin, 1993 (“Corporate Valuation), pp. 87-
88 (“control premiums paid for other companies may not be applicable to the appraisal 
target because the factors that led investors to pay premiums in other situations may not 
characterize the appraisal target.  Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the estimate of value 
derived from the market prices of securities establishes a floor beneath the company’s 
value.  Under certain circumstances, the appraiser may choose to elevate the appraised 
value above that floor to take into account a control premium.”) 
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broader set of networking peers as potentially comparable.  Thus, I first identify companies 
potentially comparable to Aruba using an objective methodology in which I document how 
frequently a peer company is relied on in contemporaneous analyst reports and investment 
banker presentations.  I reviewed the financial advisors presentations as well as Aruba analyst 
reports published between January 1, 2015 and February 27, 2015 in order to identify potential 
comparable companies.  As shown in Exhibit 6, there are 51 companies that were considered 
comparable to Aruba.  I limit my peer set to the seven companies that were selected in four or 
more of the reports and presentations considered.   
83. I calculate multiples of enterprise value to EBITDA112 for each peer company 
using that company’s enterprise value as of May 18, 2015 divided by its LTM EBITDA as of 
that same date, its projected EBITDA for the twelve months-ended December 31, 2015, and its 
projected EBITDA for the twelve months ended December 31, 2016. The median enterprise 
value to LTM EBITDA multiple for the peer group is 11.88x and the median enterprise value to 
CY 2015 EBITDA and CY 2016 EBITDA is 11.44x and 10.67x, respectively (see Exhibit 7).   
84. The implied equity value derived when applying the median EV/EBITDA 
multiple for the peer group to Aruba’s LTM EBITDA as of February 24, 2015 is $11.55 per 
share.  The implied equity value per share derived when applying the median EV/CY2015E 
EBITDA multiple for the peer group to the 2015 EBITDA estimate in the Management 
Projections is $16.68 per share and the implied equity value per share derived when applying 
the median EV/CY2016E EBITDA multiple for the peer group to the 2016 EBITDA estimate in 
the Management Projections is $21.75 per share. (see Exhibit 8).   
                                                          
112.  EBITDA in my comparable company and comparable transaction analyses reflects GAAP 
EBITDA so SBC is treated as an expense. 
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E. Comparable Transaction Analysis  
85. Investment bankers and valuation practitioners often consider a third valuation 
method that is similar to comparable company analysis but measures multiples using actual 
transaction values rather than market values.  And like a comparable company analysis, a 
comparable transaction analysis is also highly dependent on finding transactions where the 
acquired company is sufficiently comparable to the company being valued.    
86. In order to try and identify transactions that were sufficiently comparable to 
Aruba, I analyzed all transactions in the ten year period prior to the Valuation date where the 
company being acquired had an SIC code of 3576 (computer communications equipment), 3663 
(radio and television communications equipment) and 7373 (computer integrated systems 
design).  These SIC codes were selected based on the primary SIC codes of the companies I 
selected as my peer group for purposes of my beta estimate and comparable company analysis.  I 
further limited my search to closed transactions in the United States and Canada with a 
transaction value greater than $1 billion. Exhibit 9 presents a summary of the transactions 
identified using these search parameters. The median multiple of transaction value to LTM 
EBITDA for the comparable transactions was 20.5x. 
87. In Exhibit 10, I apply the median multiple for the comparable transactions to 
Aruba’s LTM EBITDA as of the Valuation Date to estimate an implied enterprise value of 
$1.684 billion.  I then subtract net debt (or in this case add net cash as Aruba had no debt and a 
cash balance of $291 million) and divide by the shares outstanding to reach my comparable 
transaction value estimate for Aruba of $17.94 per share. 
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F. Discounted Cash Flow Analysis 
88. The discounted cash flow Method is widely adopted by academics and valuation 
experts as the valuation method that most clearly reflects the underlying value of an enterprise–
that is, an explicit estimate of the enterprise’s ability to generate future cash flows.
113
  The DCF 
method is also commonly accepted, and often the sole method used, in valuing a company for 
purposes of Delaware Chancery Court appraisal proceedings.
114
  A DCF model employs 
projections of a business’ future free cash flows discounted to the valuation date at a rate of 
return that appropriately reflects the risks inherent in those expected free cash flows.
115
  The 
three key inputs to a DCF model are (i) projections of free cash flows over a finite period (for 
example, over five years from the valuation date),
116
 (ii) an estimate of the value of the free cash 
flows beyond the finite period (the firm’s “Terminal Value”), and (iii) an estimate of the 





                                                          
113. Koller, Tim, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation 5th Edition: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 2005 (“Valuation 5th Edition”), pp.. 101-102, 311, 322. 
114. See, e.g., In Re Appraisal of Dell, (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), at*114 (“Because it is 
impossible to quantify the exact degree of the sale process mispricing, this decision does 
not give weight to the Final Merger Consideration. It uses the DCF methodology 
exclusively to derive a fair value of the Company.);  Highfields Capital LTD, et al. v. AXA 
Financial, Inc., 939 A.2d 34, at *52-53 (Del. Ch. August 17, 2007), (“Typically, Delaware 
courts tend to favor a DCF model over other available methodologies in an appraisal 
proceedings.”); Andaloro et al. v. PFPC Worldwide Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. 
Ch., 2005). 
115. Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 231-232. 
116. Free cash flows represent the cash that a company is able to generate after spending the 
money required to maintain its operations. 
117. Corporate Valuation, pp. 100-101. 
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89. In the normal course of business, from late April to early June of every year, 
Aruba management creates a three year strategic and financial plan for the following three fiscal 
years.  The three year strategic and financial plan is presented to the Aruba Board at the June 
Board meeting and lays the groundwork for the Company’s annual operating plan which is 
created in August through early September of every year, and presented to the Board at the 
September Board meeting.  At the September Board meeting, the Board considers the annual 
operating plan but only approves the operating plan for the first half of the fiscal year.  Then, in 
February of every year, Aruba updates the operating plan and the Board considers and approves 
the operating plan for the second half of the fiscal year.
118
   
90. Mr. Galvin prepared the October projections identified in the Proxy (the “October 
2014 Projections) based on the three year strategic and financial plan created in June 2014, and 
the 2015 annual operating plan created in September 2014.
119
   
91. On February 2, 2015, Aruba management presented updated financial projections 
(the “February 2015 Projections”) to the Board reflecting actual financial results through the 
second quarter of 2015.  Mr. Galvin also prepared the February 2015 Projections based on the 
three year strategic and financial plan created in June 2014 and the 2015 annual operating plan 
created in September 2014 and updated in February 2015.
120
  Exhibit 11 summarizes the 
February 2015 Projections and compares them to the October 2014 Projections.  The revenue 
estimates in the February 2015 Projections are lower than the revenue estimates in the October 
2014 Projections by $12 million for fiscal 2015, $58 million for 2016, and $132 million for fiscal 
                                                          
118.  Respondents’ Responses and Objections to Petitioners’ First Interrogatories, pp. 22-23. 
119.  Id., p. 21. 
120.  Id. 
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2017.  The Non-GAAP operating profit in the February projections is $9 million higher than the 
Non-GAAP operating profit in the October Projections for fiscal 2015 and $6 million and $43 
million lower for fiscal 2016 and 2017, respectively.   
92. The revenue estimates in the February 2015 Projections were reduced due to the 
fact that Aruba had missed its bookings targets for four straight quarters and had fully depleted 
its backlog.
121
  The lower Non-GAAP operating profit in the February 2015 projections is almost 
entirely a function of the lower revenue figures as Non-GAAP operating margins actually 
increased in the February 2015 Projections in 2015 (up 130 basis points) and 2016 (up 70 basis 
points) and decreased in 2017 (down 75 basis points).   
93. Despite the reduction in revenue in the February 2015 Projections, the revenue 
growth rates in the February 2015 Projections for fiscal years 2015 through 2017 are still 
significantly higher than the expected growth rates for the WLAN industry for those same years.  
Table 1 below compares the revenue growth rates in the February Projections to the WLAN 
industry growth projections from the Dell’Oro Group.
122
  The revenue growth rate of 20 percent 
in the February Projections is almost double the 11 percent growth expectation for the WLAN 
industry.  Similarly, the revenue growth rates of 19 percent for both 2016 and 2017 in the 
February Projections are significantly higher than the expected growth rates for the WLAN 




                                                          
121.  Galvin Deposition, pp. 289-290. 
122. Dell’Oro Group, Wireless Lan Report, January 2015 (ArubaAA0196131-59). 
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Enterprise WLAN and Aruba Revenue  
       
       
  
  CY’ 14A CY’ 15E CY’ 16E CY’ 17E 
              
Enterprise WLAN 
 
$4,354.9 $4,841.5 $5,604.7 $6,156.1 
 







percent 9.8 percent 
       
   
FY’ 14A FY’ 15E FY’ 16E FY’ 17E 
       Aruba Revenue 
 
$729.0 $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 
 










       
 
94. If Aruba Management believed that they could hit the revenue figures contained 
in the February 2015 projections, analysts covering the company did not share their conviction.  
Exhibit 12 compares the revenue growth rates in the February 2015 Projections to both the 
WLAN industry expected growth rates and the expected growth rates based on the median 
consensus analyst estimates of revenue for fiscal years 2015 to 2017.  The exhibit indicates that 
analysts more or less believe in the fiscal year 2015 revenue figure but in fiscal years 2016 and 
2017, analysts’ revenue expectations are more aligned with the expected growth rate of the 
WLAN industry.  However, a November 21, 2014 Bernstein Research report expressed 
skepticism regarding even the 2015 consensus revenue estimate: 
Aruba (Underperform, $16) is set to experience pressure on margins and market share, 
as its economic model reaches its limits in a slowing market cornered by Cisco and 
Ubiquiti.  It has been already forced to come down rapidly in price point, just to keep 
stable market shares, and is likely to find it difficult to improve profitability going 
forward, as growth will have to come at the cost of increased opex.  We model FY2015 
revenues and EPS ~3 percent and ~9 percent below consensus.
123
 
                                                          
123. “Aruba: Quarter and Next Well Below Normal Seasonality; 11ac Over 50% of Revenues. 
Is Wi-Fi Now Slowing?” Bernstein Research, November 21, 2014, p. 3 
(ArubaAA0439851-68 at 53). 
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The Bernstein report further noted that Aruba’s guidance for the second quarter of fiscal year 
2015 “corresponds to only 1 percent growth, compared to normal seasonality of 8 percent for a 
second quarter” and “marks a clear slowdown in revenue.”
124
 
95. The February 2015 Projections were further extrapolated by Aruba management 
for fiscal years 2018 to 2020.
125
  I refer to the February 2015 Projections and the extrapolation of 
those projections for fiscal years 2018 to 2020 as the “Management Projections.”  I rely on the 
Management Projections as the basis for my DCF analysis as those projections reflect the most 
contemporaneous view of management’s expectations for the future financial performance of 
Aruba as of the Valuation Date and are based on financial projections that were prepared in the 
regular course.  However, given the significant challenges facing Aruba at the time of the 
Transaction, it is optimistic to assume that the Company could continue to grow in excess of the 
overall WLAN industry.  Therefore, as further discussed below, I also run a sensitivity on my 
DCF analysis assuming Aruba’s revenues grow at the projected industry growth rates over the 
explicit forecast period, an assumption more aligned with analysts’ expectations for the 
Company.   
96. It is sometimes reasonable to further extend financial projections, particularly in 
situations where an investment or change to the cost structure of the business needs to be 
explicitly modeled or the business has not otherwise reached a steady state.  For example, 
Barclays extends the financial projections in its analysis out to 2024 in order to reflect realization 
of HP’s synergy estimates.  For purposes of valuing Aruba on a standalone basis, I determine 
                                                          
124.  Id., p. 1. 
125.  Respondents’ Responses and Objections to Petitioners’ First Interrogatories, pp. 21-22. 
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that modeling a third stage was not sufficiently warranted as there was no investment or change 
to the operations that needed to be explicitly modeled.  Furthermore, given the fact that the 
Management Projections are already projecting growth well in excess of the overall industry, 
adding a third stage to the forecast would arguably add more uncertainty to the growth forecast.  
Such hyper growth assumptions get more problematic the further you move away from the three 
year period that management forecasted in the ordinary course of business. 
97. However, for reasons discussed below, I subtract stock-based compensation 
(“SBC”) expense from the non-GAAP operating figures in the Management Projections in order 
to estimate Aruba’s free cash flows. 
Stock-based Compensation  
98. The treatment of SBC in a DCF analysis continues to be debated by valuation 
practitioners and academics.  Strictly speaking, although it is treated as an expense on a 
company’s income statement, stock-based compensation is a non-cash expense and, as such, is 
added back on a company’s statement of cash flows for financial reporting purposes.  However, 
it does not follow that stock-based compensation expense should be added back when calculating 
free cash flows in a DCF analysis.  Stock-based compensation represents an economic cost to a 
company’s equity holders either in terms of equity dilution (as the company must issue shares 
upon exercise of employee stock options (“ESOs”) or vesting of restricted stock awards 
(“RSAs”)) or as an actual cash outflow (should the company choose to repurchase shares to 
eliminate or minimize equity dilution).  To treat SBC expense as something other than a cash 
outflow in estimating free cash flows would give a distorted view of how profitable the business 
is.  Aruba is a perfect example.   
99. Aruba’s elevated stock-based compensation expense relative to peers has 
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arguably enabled the company to attract the best and brightest people to the company by offering 
generous compensation packages including larger grants of stock options.  These highly 
compensated employees, in turn, help grow the revenue and earnings of the business thereby 
making it more valuable.  To completely ignore the cost to Aruba to achieve that valuation in a 
DCF analysis would result in an inaccurate valuation.  To do so would mean including all of the 
benefits (higher revenue, higher profits, etc.) of the higher compensation structure but none of 
the cost.  How to most properly account for the cost of SBC expense has and will continue to be 
debated, but it should not be completely ignored. 
100. The idea that stock-based compensation represents a true economic cost to the 
corporation is widely accepted by academics.  Responding to the argument that SBC is non-cash 
and therefore should not be treated as an expense, Damodaran (2005) states: 
There are some accounting and valuation analysts who argue that option grants do not 
affect cash flows and that it therefore does not affect value. This argument makes no 
sense. After all, if the option-granting firm had issued the options to the market (as 
traded warrants) and used the resulting cash proceeds to compensate employees, we 
would have considered it an operating expense. We cannot reward firms for using their 
equity as currency. If we do, firms may very well switch to paying for everything with 




101. This Court has also recognized that “once it reaches a material level, SBC must in 
some manner be accounted for in order to reach a reasonable calculation of fair value.  The real 




102. In its fairness analysis, Qatalyst accounted for the dilutive effect of stock-based 
                                                          
126.  Damodaran, Aswath. (2005) Employee Stock Options (ESOPs) and Restricted Stock: 
Valuation Effects and Consequences, p. 14. 
127.  In Re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., Memorandum Opinion, January 30, 2015, p. 53. 
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compensation over the forecast period by applying a “dilution factor” to the total shares 
outstanding.  This dilution factor is intended to capture the dilution and was based on projected 
net new shares (i.e., net of stock repurchases) provided by Aruba management.
128
  The Qatalyst 
dilution factor of 28 percent is an arguably understated approximation of the economic cost of 
the dilution given Aruba’s extensive use of SBC.  If Qatalyst had simply modeled SBC expense 
as a constant percentage of sales in its DCF, the percentage of sales equivalent of the dilution 
factor it applied would be approximately 5.4 percent
129
, considerably lower than Aruba’s SBC 
percentage of sales of approximately 15 percent at the time of the Transaction.  
103. One indication that Aruba’s use of SBC historically represented a significant 
economic cost is that the Company paid approximately $369 million over its most recent three 
fiscal years to repurchase common stock.
130
  As noted above, SBC represents a cost to a 
company either in terms of share dilution or cash outflows to minimize the impact of share 
dilution upon SBC exercises (i.e., common shares granted upon the exercise of ESOs or vesting 
of RSAs).
131
  In order to assess this cost to Aruba historically, Exhibit 14 calculates the net cash 
                                                          
128. Boutros Deposition, pp. 120-122.  
129.  See Exhibit 13A-B.  Exhibit 13A reflects the Qatalyst DCF model while 13B solves for the 
SBC percent of sales that results in the same value as Qatalyst using a dilution factor. 
130.  This included $19.9 million in fiscal year 2012, $86.2 million in fiscal year 2013, and 
$263.0 million in fiscal year 2014.  Aruba 2014 10-K, p. 70. 
131.  The issuance of SBC grants represents a cost to stockholders in terms of share dilution at 
the time those grants vest, are exercised and exchanged for common stock.  The cost to 
existing stockholders can be thought of as the net cash outflow required to maintain the 
number of shares outstanding (i.e., to achieve no share dilution).  In particular, the cost to 
existing stockholders of the exercise of SBC grants is the difference between the price paid 
by the company to repurchase a sufficient number of shares to satisfy the number of shares 
exercised (a cash outflow) and the sum of the price paid by employees to exercise the ESO 
grants and the tax benefit the company receives when employees exercise non-qualified 
ESO grants (both cash inflows).  The tax benefit is calculated based on the difference 
between the market price of the stock at the time of exercise and the exercise price, 
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outflow required in fiscal years 2008 – 2014 to eliminate share dilution from actual SBC 
exercises.
132
  The exhibit shows that the net cash outflow required to eliminate share dilution 
from actual SBC exercises over the seven year period leading up to the merger, while highly 
variable in any individual year, averaged 15 percent of Revenues, or slightly higher than the 
average SBC expense as a percent of Revenues (14 percent) over the 2008 – 2014 period.  
Moreover, the exhibit shows the significant cash flow impact should Aruba have chosen to 
eliminate share dilution in years with significant SBC exercises.  For example, the net cash 
outflow to eliminate dilution in FY 2011 would have been $161 million (41 percent of 
Revenues) when 7.6 million shares were exercised and the stock price averaged $25.13.  And in 
FY 2014, the net cash outflow to eliminate dilution of $112 million (15 percent of Revenues) is 
almost identical to the actual SBC expense ($111 million, or 15 percent of Revenues).  Based on 
this comparison of the historical SBC expense to net cash outflow to eliminate dilution, it 
appears that using projected SBC expense is a reasonable (if not understated) measure of future 
net cash outflow from SBC exercises given that 4 million unexercised ESOs and 8.4 million 
RSUs were outstanding as of the Appraisal Date, and thus may have been exercised over the next 
two to three years absent accelerated vesting from the merger.
133
 
104. I identified two different SBC forecasts in the record.  The first forecast (the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
multiplied by the number of exercised shares.  (Ciccotello, Conrad S., C. Terry Grant, and 
Gerry H. Grant, “Impact of Employee Stock Options on Cash Flow,” Financial Analysts 
Journal (March/April 2004) (“Ciccotello et al. (2004)”), p. 40) 
132.  For years in which Aruba repurchase stock, I use the average price for shares repurchased 
to calculate the net cash flow impact of eliminating the dilution from the actual number of 
shares exercised during that year.  In the two years with no share repurchase (FY 2010 and 
2011), I use the average stock price during the year.    
133. Aruba Proxy, pp. 58-59; Aruba Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ending July 31, 2014, pp. 
92-93.   
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“Barclays SBC Forecast”) is reflected in the Barclay’s model and assumes that Aruba’s SBC 
expense is between 10 and 11 percent of sales across the forecast period.  The second forecast 
(the “Proxy Reconciliation SBC Forecast”) is reflected in the Aruba Proxy in the reconciliation 
between GAAP operating income and the Non-GAAP operating income reflected in the 
Management Projections and assumes that SBC declines to approximately 7 percent of sales 
across the forecast period.  I understand that the Proxy Reconciliation SBC Forecast was 
prepared by Aruba after the Management Projections were prepared and provided to the financial 
advisors in February 2015.
134
  Aruba’s SBC as a percent of sales historically and as reflected in 
the two SBC forecasts is presented in Figure 5.   
Figure 5 
SBC as a Percent of Sales 
 
 
105. Given the significant revenue growth in excess of the industry reflected in the 
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Management Projections as well as Aruba’s historical elevated SBC expense, I think it is 
unreasonable to assume that Aruba would be able to retain and motivate an employee base 
sufficient to fuel the projected excess revenue growth while cutting its SBC percent of sales in 
half.  The non-GAAP EBITDA figures in the Barclays forecast are identical to the non-GAAP 
EBITDA figures in the Aruba Proxy so it could not be the case that SBC expense is assumed to 
be replaced with some other form of compensation in the Proxy Reconciliation Forecast.  
Therefore, I rely on the Barclays SBC Forecast in my DCF analysis but also run a sensitivity (see 
below) using the Proxy Reconciliation SBC Forecast coupled with revenue growth rates based 
on the expected growth for the industry. 
106. Exhibit 15 presents the Management Projections I rely on in determining Aruba’s 
fair value in my DCF analysis. 
ii. Terminal Value 
107. Aruba’s estimated enterprise value equals the sum of the discounted free cash 
flows in the explicit forecast period (2015 – 2020) and the present value of its free cash flows 
beyond the explicit forecast period (i.e., its terminal value).  The growth in perpetuity model (or 
Gordon Growth Model) is a widely accepted method of estimating a terminal value in a DCF 
model by financial economists, practitioners and courts. 135  Investment bankers often instead 
estimate a company’s terminal value by applying an exit multiple.  Such an approach to 
                                                          
135.  The Gordon Growth Model values the company at the end of the forecast period (time t), 
Vt = FCFt+1/(WACC – g), which FCFt+1 = FCFt×(1+g), FCF = free cash flow and g = 
growth in perpetuity rate.  Damodaran, Aswath, Investment Valuation 3rd Edition: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2012 (“Investment Valuation 3rd Edition”), p. 306.  Corporate 
Valuation, pp. 146-148; In Re PNB Holding Co. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 28-N., 
2006 WL 2403999, at *31 (Del. Ch. August 18, 2006).  Add cite to DFC for point that DE 
Chancery Court likes Gordon Growth Model. 
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estimating a company’s terminal value results in a mix of relative and intrinsic valuation
136
 and 
explicitly assumes the target company at the terminal date is comparable in terms of growth, 
margins and return on investment to that of the selected comparison companies as of the 
valuation date.
137  The growth in perpetuity model is superior to using an exit multiple since it 
allows the valuation expert to explicitly consider the growth prospects for the subject company 
reflected in management’s projections at the end of the explicit forecast period, along with 
contemporaneous estimates of long-term growth prospects for the economy and industry.  
Therefore, it is my opinion that the use of a growth in perpetuity model is the proper way to 
estimate Aruba’s terminal value. 
iii. Growth Rate 
108. One assumption implicit in applying the growth-in-perpetuity method is that free 
cash flows have reached a steady state in the terminal period. 138  The growth rate used to 
estimate the terminal value should therefore also reflect a long-term, stable growth rate for the 
company’s free cash flows (i.e., the rate at which they are expected to grow in perpetuity). 139  A 
reasonable long-term growth rate for a viable company is likely at or above the rate of inflation 
(i.e., zero real growth) but should not be greater than that of the economy in which the company 
operates (i.e., the nominal GDP growth rate for a company with domestic operations). 140 
                                                          
136.  See, e.g., Investment Valuation 3rd Edition, p. 305-306; Pratt, Shannon P., and Alina 
Niculita, Valuing a Business 5th Edition: McGraw Hill, 2008 (“Valuing a Business 5th 
Edition”), p. 220; Pratt, Shannon P., Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples Fifth 
Edition: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2014) (“Cost of Capital Fifth Edition”), pp. 48-49.  
137.  See, e.g., Corporate Valuation, pp. 160, 166-167; Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 226-227.  
138.  Corporate Valuation, pp. 146-147; Valuation 5th Edition, p. 214. 
139.  Valuation 5th Edition, p. 214. 
140.  Investment Valuation 3rd Edition, pp. 306-307; Corporate Valuation, p. 147.  The expected 
 
JX 666 - p. 50 of 120
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
49 
 
109. Exhibit 16 summarizes estimates of long-term real GDP growth, long term 
inflation and nominal GDP as of the Valuation Date.  As shown in the exhibit, long-term real 
GDP ranged from 2.20 percent to 2.50 percent, long term inflation ranged from 2.00 percent to 
2.30 percent, and overall nominal GDP growth ranged from 4.20 percent to 4.75 percent.  The 
exhibit also shows the median of the estimates of long-term inflation was 2.25 percent and the 
median of the estimates of long-term nominal GDP was 4.60 percent.  For purposes of estimating 
Aruba’s growth in free cash flow beyond the explicit forecast period, I assume a perpetual 
growth rate of 2.75 percent, which equals my risk free rate. 
110. Although the risk-free rate as of the Valuation Date of 2.75 percent falls below 
economists’ estimates of the expected nominal GDP rate, some financial economists caution that 
the risk-free rate (i.e., the yield on U.S. Treasury securities) should serve as the ceiling for a 
stable, long-term growth rate.  In a recent opinion, this Court adopted the theory that the risk-free 
rate should serve as a ceiling to the growth rate in perpetuity.  Therefore, I select 2.75 percent as 
my growth rate and note that it represents a 50 basis point premium over the median long-term 
inflation estimate of 2.25 percent. 
iv. Discount Rate 
111. In order to estimate enterprise value using the DCF method, one discounts the 
company’s expected free cash flows over the life of the firm using a risk-adjusted discount rate.  
Risk-adjusted discount rates are the rates of return required by the market to induce market 
participants to invest capital.  Conceptually, risk-adjusted discount rates are determined by three 
factors: (i) the rate of return required by the market for a risk-free investment, (ii) the underlying 
relevant risk of the expected free cash flows of the investment, and (iii) the rate of return 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
growth rate of the U.S. economy is generally measured by the nominal GDP growth rate. 
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required by the market to bear that additional risk.
141
 
112. I use a weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) calculation to determine the 
appropriate risk-adjusted discount rates to discount Aruba’s projected free cash flows.  WACC is 
the weighted average of the cost of equity capital and the after-tax cost of debt capital based on 
the company’s expected or target capital structure (that is, the relative proportion of debt and 
equity ownership): 
WACC = (Cost of Equity x Equity Weight) + (After Tax Cost of Debt x Debt Weight) 
113. WACC is the appropriate discount rate to use when discounting free cash flows 
available to both debt and equity holders under the DCF method because, other things equal, it 




Capital Structure (Equity and Debt) Weights 
114. The weighting of debt and equity in the WACC calculation is based on the target 
capital structure of the firm, which may not necessarily be the same as its historical or current 
capital structure.
143
  As of April 30, 2015, the quarter end date prior to May 18, 2015, Aruba had 
no debt outstanding resulting in an equity-to-capitalization ratio of 100 percent.  Aruba had no 
debt outstanding for the entire five year period prior to the valuation date and although Aruba 
had considered a convertible debt offering, no final decision to move forward with that offering 
had been made at the time of the Transaction.  Therefore, I adopt the Company’s current capital 
structure in my WACC calculation.  
                                                          
141. See, e.g., Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 231-234 
142. See, e.g., Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 231-232. 
143. See, e.g., Corporate Valuation, p. 224. 
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115. I employ a tax rate of 30.0 percent in my estimation of the appropriate discount 
rate for Aruba, consistent with the tax rate used in my estimation of Aruba’s after-tax free cash 




Cost of Equity 
116. Unlike a company’s cost of debt, its cost of equity is not directly observable since 
equity holders (as a company’s residual claimants) do not receive a guaranteed rate of return.  I 
use the widely accepted Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) as the basis for measuring the 
equity cost of capital for Aruba.
145
  The CAPM defines a firm’s risk-adjusted rate of return on 
equity as equal to the risk-free rate of return plus a premium for risk (a measure of the firm’s risk 
relative to the market’s risk, multiplied by a measure of the premium associated with the 
riskiness of the equity market as a whole – referred to as the equity risk premium).  A firm’s 
relative or systematic risk is typically called beta, and it measures both the operating risk and 
financial risk for the firm.
146
  The equity risk premium measures the rate of return necessary to 
compensate investors for the added risk of purchasing equity securities instead of a risk-free 
security (for example, a government bond).  Under the CAPM, the cost of equity is calculated as 
follows: 
Cost of Equity = Risk-Free Rate + (Beta x Equity Risk Premium) 
                                                          
144.  See Athens Cash Flow Template 02-04-15 from MG.xlsx (ArubaAA0053461).  
145.  See, e.g., Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 234-236. 
146.  A beta equal to 1.0 means the company’s stock is as variable as the market as a whole 
(generally measured by an index such as the S&P 500), whereas a beta less (greater) than 
1.0 implies that the company’s stock is less (more) variable than the market. 
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Risk Free Rate 
117. The risk free rate is generally estimated by U.S. government bonds with terms 
that approximate those of the cash flows being discounted.
147
  I use the 20-year U.S. Treasury 
Securities yield available as of May 18, 2015 for the risk-free rate of return: 2.75 percent.
148
  
While valuation professionals commonly estimate risk free rates using the yield on long-term 
Treasury securities ranging in maturity from between 10 and 30 years, it is my customary 
practice to use the 20-year government bond yield as it is consistent with the term of the risk-free 




118. Beta measures the extent to which a given stock return varies relative to the return 
on the entire stock market, or the systematic risk of the firm.  Typically in a CAPM model, beta 
is measured using historical data to estimate a forward looking beta.  Beta estimates are 
imprecise and there is no common standard approach to estimate beta.
150
  Many practitioners 
suggest using two or five years of weekly or monthly returns to estimate historical beta.
151
  There 
are tradeoffs with each combination of the measurement period and measurement frequency.  A 
longer measurement period provides more data points but the firm might have changed its risk 
characteristics (i.e., changes in corporate strategy or capital structure) over the estimation period, 
                                                          
147. Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 236-238. Corporate Valuation, pp. 209-212 advocates using a 
long-term government bond yield (i.e., 10 – 30 years) and netting out the implied term 
premium, but notes that this adjustment is not widely employed in practice. 
148. 20-year Total Constant Maturity Treasury Yield as of May 18, 2015.  Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED). 
149. Cost of Capital Fifth Edition, pp. 93-94. 
150. Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 247.  
151. Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 247.  Cost of Capital Fifth Edition, p. 208.  
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thus making some of the data points irrelevant.
152
 
119. In addition to the multiple measurement period and frequency options for 
measuring historical beta, there are also forward-looking or predicted beta measures published 
by Morgan Stanley Capital International (“MSCI”) Barra.  However, Barra betas have yet to be 
embraced by academics, authoritative valuation texts, and this Court.  A 2009 survey of 
professors found that the majority rely on sources using a regression-based approach (like 
Bloomberg) to justify their beta estimates.
153
  I am also unaware of any academic evidence 
indicating that Barra beta estimates are superior predictors of a stock’s future beta than are 
historical estimates such as Bloomberg.  Moreover, a commonly referenced valuation textbook 
cautions on the use of Barra betas because they are not replicable.
154
  I understand that, for these 




                                                          
152. Investment Valuation 3rd Edition, p. 188.  Valuation 5th Edition, p. 247.     
153.  Fernandez, Pablo, 2009, “Betas Used by Professors: A Survey with 2,500 Answers,” IESE 
Working Paper WP-822, at 2-3 http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0822-E.pdf 
154.  Cost of Capital, Fifth Edition. Chapter 15 under subchapter “BARRA’s Fundamental 
Betas” (“Barra predicted betas are derived from a proprietary fundamental risk model.  The 
fact that the model is not replicable can be a problem in some settings such as litigation.”).  
155.  In Re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp. C.A. No. 10107-CB at *24 (“Perhaps most 
problematic, neither Beaulne nor any published research has demonstrated the predictive 
effectiveness of Barra betas. Consequently, I have very little information guiding whether 
to rely on Barra betas in constructing a valuation of DFC. There is no benefit to using a 
second beta methodology without confidence in the methodology itself.”)  Global GT et al. 
v. Golden Telecom, Inc. C.A. No. 3698–VCS  993 A.2d 497 at *520 (Del. Ch. April 23, 
2010) (“For starters, the Barra forecasting model is proprietary, and cannot be reverse-
engineered. The Barra predictive beta, which is a forecast of a stock’s future looking beta 
using past data, is based on a thirteen-factor model, but the weight given to each of the 
factors is not publicly available. In fact, Barra has used three different versions of its model 
without explaining why or what changes have been made, and it is not apparent whether 
Barra retroactively updates its past beta calculations as it tinkers with? improves? Changes 
for changes’ sake? or lessens? the reliability of its model. * * *  [T]he Barra beta’s 
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120. It has typically been my practice to rely on a beta measure estimated using 2 years 
of weekly returns for the target company relative to the returns on a market index (i.e., S&P 
500).
156
  However, in certain cases, a historical 2 year measurement window is distorted in a way 
as  to not be representative of the risk of the business moving forward (e.g., a major acquisition 
or divestiture is announced).  In such cases, I have typically looked to an alternate “clean” 
measurement period or relied on an industry beta measure estimated using a group of peer 
companies.  I have also typically relied on a “raw” beta measure rather than an “adjusted” 
measure.
157
  However, a recent opinion from this Court concluded that a 5 year measurement 
window was “conducive to a more accurate measure of beta.”  That same opinion also opted to 
use an adjusted beta measure in order to produce a forward-looking WACC estimate in lieu of 
relying on a predicted beta from Barra.
158
 
121. In light of this, I consider multiple estimates of Aruba’s adjusted historical beta as 
of February 24, 2015, the last trading day prior to the rumors of a potential acquisition of Aruba 
by HP.  I measured Aruba’s adjusted beta using various measurement periods and frequency 
intervals typically suggested by practitioners and academic textbooks.
159
  Aruba’s adjusted beta 
measure using 2 years of weekly, 5 years of weekly, and 5 years of monthly data is 0.87, 1.41, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reliability is not buttressed by the weight of any reliable academic or professional literature. 
The only evidence that the petitioners have produced showing that the Barra beta has a 
greater reliability than other beta providers such as Bloomberg or Morningstar is a quarter-
century old paper authored by Barr Rosenberg, the creator of the Barra beta. No neutral 
academic support for the predictive power of the Barra beta has yet been published.”) 
156. This is the default setting from Bloomberg.  Valuation 5th Edition, p. 247.  
157.  Bloomberg publishes an adjusted beta measure that accounts for the fact that, over time, 
betas tend to revert to the market mean or 1.0.  The calculation assigns a 2/3 weighting to 
the “raw” beta and a 1/3 weighting to the market beta of 1.0. 
158. In Re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp. C.A. No. 10107-CB at *29.   
159.  See, e.g., Corporate Valuation, pp. 300-301.    
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and 1.46, respectively. 
122. An alternative to calculating a company specific beta is to calculate an industry 
beta by measuring the beta of selected peers, unlevering the peer betas to remove the impact of 
leverage, and then relevering the mean or median unlevered beta to a target capital structure.
160
 I 
analyze the same peer group for my industry beta that I relied on in my comparable company 
analysis.  I calculate each company’s adjusted betas using 2 years of weekly, 5 years of weekly, 
and 5 years of monthly returns.  I then unlever the betas and calculate a mean and median 
unlevered adjusted beta.
161
  Since I am adopting Aruba’s current capital structure of 100 percent 
equity, I do not have to relever the peer betas.  Table 2 below summarizes my company specific 
and industry median adjusted beta measures. 
Table 2 
Adjusted Beta Measures 
               
  
2 Year 5 Year 5 Year 
  
Weekly Weekly Monthly 
          
Aruba Networks 0.87 1.41 1.46 
     Peer Median 1.10 1.12 1.24 
          
See Exhibits 17A-17C 
 
Equity Risk Premium 
123. The appropriate equity risk premium to be employed in a WACC calculation is 
the premium investors will demand in order to invest in equities rather than risk free securities 
over the period of the cash flows to be discounted in the DCF.  There are several approaches to 
                                                          
160. Valuation 5th Edition, pp. 250-252.  
161. βu = βe / (1 + (D/E) * (1- t)).  Valuation 5th Edition, p. 785.  Investment Banking, p. 130. 
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estimating the equity risk premium commonly used by practitioners and academics in their 
calculations of the cost of equity.  These approaches include surveys of finance professionals or 
academics, models that estimate the implied equity risk premium based on current equity prices, 
and estimates using historical returns data.
162
  The standard approach for many years was to 
estimate the future equity risk premium using the observed historical market equity risk 
premium.
163
  Recently, however, finance professors and valuation professionals have advocated 
the so-called supply-side equity risk premium, which adjusts the historical equity risk premium 
to reflect more recent expectations of equity returns based on real earnings growth.
164
   
124. I adopt the supply-side equity risk premium based on its current level of broad 
acceptance by the valuation community and the Delaware Chancery Court.
165
  Duff & Phelps, 
                                                          
162. Within each of these methods of estimating the equity risk premium, there are multiple 
differences in the level of subjectivity involved in the assumptions employed and the 
choice of inputs, including the use of historical versus forecasted data and the time period 
chosen.  See Damodaran, Aswath, “Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, 
Estimation and Implications – The 2011 Edition,” NYU Stern School of Business, 
Updated: February 2011, pp. 81-82.   
163. 2015 Valuation Handbook, Guide to Cost of Capital, (“2015 Valuation Handbook”) pp. 3-
22 – 3-23.  Duff & Phelps (formerly Ibbotson Associates) , published in the 2015 Valuation 
Handbook, estimates the historical equity risk premium using data on the arithmetic 
average premium that equity securities have generated above risk free securities over the 
period 1926 – 2014.  Historical equity risk premium estimates from Duff and Phelps have 
been accepted for valuing companies in appraisals and other valuation disputes in the 
Delaware Chancery Court.   
164. Duff and Phelps forecasts the equity risk premium through a supply side model using 
historical returns data.  The model decomposes historical returns into four pieces (inflation, 
income return, growth in real earnings per share, and growth in P/E ratios).  The model, 
however, eliminates the fourth component, growth in P/E ratios (which reflect investor’s 
expectation of earnings growth), in estimating the forward looking equity risk premium 
based on the assumption that the historical growth in P/E ratios will not continue.  2015 
Valuation Handbook, pp. 3-26 – 3-28. 
165. Supply side equity risk premium estimates from Ibbotson Associates (nka Duff & Phelps) 
have been accepted for valuing companies in appraisals and other valuation disputes in the 
Delaware Chancery Court.  See, e.g., Global GT LP and Global GT Ltd, Petitioners, v. 
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which reports estimates of both the long-term historical equity risk premium and supply-side 
equity risk premium each year, reported a supply-side equity risk premium estimate based on 




125. The WACC estimates based on the inputs discussed above are presented in Table 
3.  The estimates of Aruba’s WACC based on Aruba’s adjusted beta measures range from 8.2 
percent  to 11.8 percent while the estimates of Aruba’s WACC based on the peer median 
adjusted beta measures range from 9.6 percent to 10.5 percent.  The mean and median WACC 
estimate based on Aruba’s adjusted beta measures are 10.50 percent and 11.52 percent, 
respectively.  The mean and median WACC estimate based on the peer adjusted beta measures 
are 9.98 percent and 9.81 percent, respectively. 
Table 3 
Aruba WACC Estimates Based on Adjusted Beta Measures 
               
  
2 Year 5 Year 5 Year 
  
Weekly Weekly Monthly 
          
Aruba Networks 8.17% 11.52% 11.81% 
     Peer Median 9.58% 9.73% 10.46% 
          
      
 
126. Exhibit 18 presents the WACC estimates in Table 3 as well as other 
contemporaneous measures of Aruba’s WACC at the time of the Transaction, including 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Golden Telecom, C.A. No. 3698-VCS. 2010 WL 1663987, at 517 (Del. Ch. April 23, 
2010); In Re: Appraisal of the Orchard Enterprises, Inc., C.A. No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 
2923305, at *18-19 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012). 
166. 2015 Valuation Handbook, p. 3-28. 
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estimates from the financial advisors involved in the Transaction and equity analysts covering 
Aruba.  Qatalyst Partners relied on a WACC range of 10.5 percent to 14 percent with a midpoint 
of 12.25 percent while both Evercore and Barclays relied on a WACC range of 11 percent to 13 
percent with a midpoint of 12 percent.  In addition, the two equity analysts with published 
WACC estimates at the time of the Transaction both estimated a WACC of 12 percent. 
127. Based on the range of WACC estimates summarized above and presented in 
Exhibit 18, I select the midpoint of 11 percent an present a WACC range of 10.75 percent to 
11.25 percent. 
v. DCF Value Conclusion 
128. Using the inputs described above: (a) Management Projections; (b) WACC of 
11.00 percent; and (c) perpetuity growth rate of 2.75 percent my DCF model implies a valuation 
of $19.85 per share (see Exhibit 19A).   Given that the Management Projections assume 
revenue growth rates that exceed the growth rate of the overall LAN Market, I also run a 
sensitivity on my DCF analysis reducing the growth rates in the Management Projections to a 
level more commensurate with the expected growth of the industry and assuming the Proxy 
Reconciliation SBC Forecast.  The industry growth DCF sensitivity results in a value of $19.45 




129. It is my opinion that Aruba’s standalone fair value is most accurately measured 
using a DCF analysis based on the Management Projections.  My DCF analysis indicates a fair 
                                                          
167. If the lower revenue growth projections are used with the Barclays SBC Forecast in my 
DCF, the resulting value is $17.51 per share. If the Management Projections are used with 
the Proxy SBC Forecast in my DCF, the resulting value is $23.22 per share (See Exhibits 
19C-19D). 
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value per share of $19.85.  My fair value conclusion is supported by the other indications of fair 
value discussed above and summarized in the Table 4. 
Table 4 
Summary of Aruba Value Indications 
 
Value Indication   Low Mid High 
      Dages DCF Value     $19.85   












      Analyst Price Targets before Bloomberg Report $19.00 $23.50 $28.00 
      Analyst Price Targets after Bloomberg Report $20.00 $27.00 $34.00 
      Qatalyst - Average of Valuation Methods $18.22 $22.93 $27.64 
      Evercore - Average of Valuation Methods $19.69 $23.09 $26.48 
      Barclays - Average of Valuation Methods $22.66 $25.54 $28.41 












      Comparable Transactions 
 
$17.94 
           
 
130. While the merger price less synergies can be a reliable indication of fair value, 
particularly in cases where other valuation methodologies fall short, I believe a DCF analysis 
based on Management Projections is a more direct method for measuring Aruba’s standalone 
value.  Moreover, both HP’s internal analysis and its advisors DCF analysis of Aruba on a 
standalone basis indicate fair values that are similar to my DCF value conclusion. 
131. I find the contemporaneous analyst price targets to be informative, particularly the 
increase in the price targets after Bloomberg reported that Aruba was in talks with HP about a 
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332 S. Michigan Ave. 
Chicago, IL 60604 
(312) 322-0227 (direct) 




FIELD OF SPECIALIZATION 




B.B.A. Accounting (1979) University of Notre Dame 




Compass Lexecon (formerly Lexecon), Executive Vice President, 2013 – Present, 
Senior Vice President, 2006 – 2013 
 
Chicago Partners, LLC, Principal, 1996 - 2006 
Principal in litigation consulting firm.  Provided testifying and consulting expert 
services in a variety of litigation and pre-litigation engagements. 
 
Fort Dearborn Partners, Co-founder and Principal, 1990 – 1995 
Co-founder and principal in a financial and management consulting firm specializing in 
middle market companies and providing business valuation consulting for litigation 
support. 
 
The Alcar Group Inc., Vice President and Director of Consulting, 1984 – 1990 
Vice president and director of consulting for a financial consulting, software, and 
education firm specializing in shareholder value issues. Alcar clients included over 30% 
of the Fortune 500, major money center banks, and accounting firms. 
 
Abbott Laboratories, International Auditor and Diagnostic Sales Representative, 1981 
– 1984 Reviewed accounting and reporting systems at Abbott offices worldwide. 
Received President's Award for outstanding performance. 
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Grant Thornton, Senior Auditor, 1979 – 1981 
Supervised and performed audits in a variety of industries including manufacturing, 
distribution, financial services, construction, not-for-profit, and government.  
 
PROFESSION AFFILIATION 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
 
 
SPEAKING AND GUEST LECTURE ENGAGEMENTS 
Guest Lecturer in Financial Statement Analysis courses at University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business (1995 – Present) 
 
Panel Speaker on Appraisal Valuation at Institutional Investor Education Forum 
conferences (December 6, 2013; January 29, 2014; May 21, 2014; June 27, 2014) 
 
 
SELECT CASE EXPERIENCE 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Case No. 7129—Court of Chancery of the State of 
Delaware —Appraisal and Fraud Action.  Consulting expert on behalf of respondent.  
Deposed in Appraisal remand trial.   
 
Sheldon Shore, et al v. Laidlaw, Inc., et al., Master File No. 91-CV-1829—United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—10b.5 securities action.  
Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
Middleby and Co. v. Hussmann, Inc., Case No. 90-C-2744 and 91-C-3188 —Seventh 
Circuit Court in Northern Illinois, August 1992 -- Merger price dispute and jury trial.  
Testifying expert (deposition and trial) on behalf of plaintiff.   
 
The Proctor & Gamble Company v. Mafco Holdings, Inc., Revlon, Inc., Revlon 
International Corporation, and Max Factor & Co., Arb. No. 13 181 00084 92, before the 
American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Tribunal, November 18, 
1992.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
The Employees Retirement Systems of Alabama, et al. v. The May Department Stores 
Company, Inc., Case No. CV92-2726-R – Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial 
Circuit, Montgomery County Alabama-- Jury trial involving early redemption of bonds.  
Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
Michael D. Wolin, et al. v. National Health Laboratories, Incorporated, et al., Case No. 
659511 – United States District Court Southern California – 10b.5 securities action.  
Consulting expert on behalf of defendant.   
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In the Matter of the Application of Vision Hardware Group, Inc., Case No. 13385 — 
Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware - Section 262 Appraisal case, April 1995.  
Testifying expert (deposition and trial) on behalf of respondent.   
 
John Healy vs. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, et al. No. 83 L 21031 – Circuit Court of 
Cook County, Illinois County Department – Law Division, May 1994.  Testifying 
expert (deposition and trial) on behalf of plaintiffs regarding defendant’s ability to pay 
measures.   
 
Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG and Miklos Vendel v. H. Frederick Johnston, 
Sandra Spillane and Technicorp International II, Inc., Case No. 13506 – Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware - Section 225 matter.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
plaintiff. 
 
Gus Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc. and Geldermann Securities Inc., Case No. 95-L-509 - 
Circuit Court of Cook County - Jury trial involving breach of contract, diversion of 
corporate opportunity and constructive fraud.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
SSMC Inc. N.V. Plaintiff/Counterclaim - defendant, v. Singer Furniture Company, et 
al., Case No. 93-0952-R - United States District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia Roanoke Division – Fraud action.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
Danaher Corporation and WEC Corporation v. Acme - Cleveland Corporation, et al., 
Case No. C2-96-0247 – United States District Court for the Western District of Ohio 
Eastern Division - Temporary Restraining Order hearing involving the Control Share 
Acquisition Act (Ohio) and the Ohio Take-Over Act.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
defendant. 
 
Janet Zimek, et al. v. Centel Corporation, et al., Case No. 92-C-3551 (and related cases) 
– United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division – 
10b.5 securities action.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
NRG Barriers, Inc. v. Frederick T. Jelin, et al., Case No. 15013 - Court of Chancery of 
the State of Delaware, July 1996 – Fraud action.  Testifying expert (deposition and trial) 
on behalf of plaintiffs.   
 
Arthur Kapit, et al. v. Victor M.G. Chaltiel, et al., Case No. SACV-94-893-LHM (EEX) 
- United States District Court of Central District of California – 10b.5 securities action 
on behalf of Abbey Healthcare Group, Inc.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
In Re:  Checkers Securities Litigation, Case No. 93-1749-CIV.-T-17A - United States 
District Court, for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, 10b.5 securities 
action.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
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Charles L. Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corporation, Case No. 12334 - Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware, November 1996 – Appraisal action seeking to 
determine fair value of Petitioners’ shares based on the Corporation’s future cash flows. 
Testifying expert (deposition and trial) on behalf of respondent. 
 
Carlton Investments, derivatively on behalf of TLC Beatrice International Holdings, 
Inc. v. TLC Beatrice International Holdings, Inc. , et al., Case No. 13950 – Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware. Derivative action on behalf of the company to 
recover alleged damages including, a $22.1 million retroactive “compensation package” 
paid to the late CEO and principal stockholder.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
 
In Re:  Woolworth Corporation Securities Class Action Litigation  Master File No. 94 
Civ. 2217 (RO) – United States District Court Southern District of New York  - 10b.5 
securities action. Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
In Re:  Arbitration between Vitafort International Corporation and Keebler Company, 
Case No. 74-488-01081-96, before the American Arbitration Association (San 
Francisco).  Lost profits claim.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
State of Wisconsin Investment Board & Cede & Co. v. Corporate Software, Inc., Case 
No. 13519 – Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Appraisal action.  Consulting 
expert on behalf of petitioner. 
 
Richard C. Goodwin v. LIVE Entertainment Inc., et al., C.A. No. 15765 NC – Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Breach of fiduciary duty action in a shareholders 
buyout.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
 
Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc. et al. v. Pennzoil Company, et al., Civil Action 
No. 15755 – Court of Chancery of State of Delaware.  Breach of fiduciary duty action 
resulting from Pennzoil’s refusal to nullify anti-takeover measures aimed at thwarting 
UPRG’s tender offer and merger.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
 
MetalClad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 – 
Before the Honorable Tribunal Established Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Expert testimony on behalf of the 
government of Mexico (defendant) in arbitration. 
 
Safety-Kleen Corporation v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., Docket No. 97 C 
8003 – In the United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - Eastern 
Division.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
  
 
In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation Securities Litigation, Class Action No. CIV 
96-442 BB/LCS – United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.  
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Testifying expert for the single largest shareholder (State of Wisconsin Investment 
Board) in a 10b.5 settlement regarding a proposed reduction in attorneys’ fees.      
 
 
In Re Waste Management, Inc. Securities Litigation, Master File No. 97 C 7709 – In the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois –  Eastern Division, 
10b.5 securities action and various asset purchase cases.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
defendant. 
 
Daniel R. McLean and Francis I. Butler v. Alloyd Co., Inc., et al., No. 95 CH 1422 – In 
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Law Division.  Action 
for wrongful dismissal.  Testifying expert (deposition and trial) on behalf of defendants.   
 
Arthur L. Gustafson, et al. v. Alloyd Co., Inc., et al., No. 93 L 6341 – In the Circuit 
Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Law Division.  Purchase price 
dispute.  Testifying expert (deposition and trial) on behalf of defendants (Buyers).   
 
B. Peter Knudson v. Samsonite Corporation, et al., Case No. 98CV2210 – District 
Court, City and County of Denver, Colorado, 10b.5 securities action.  Consulting expert 
on behalf of defendant. 
 
Merisel, Inc. v. Turnberry Capital Management, L.P., et al., C.A. No. 15906 NC - Court 
of Chancery of State of Delaware.  Testifying expert on behalf of plaintiff (deposition).  
 
In Re: Credit Acceptance Corporation Securities Litigation, Consolidated Master File 
No. 98-70417 – United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
Southern Division, 10b.5 securities action.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
Robert Clark v. National Techteam, Inc., et al., Case No. 97-60248 – United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 10b.5 securities action.  Consulting 
expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
In Re Mafco Holdings Securities Litigation  - United States District Court, Southern 
District of New York, 10b.5 securities action.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
defendant. 
 
Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., v. Iris Cantor, et al., C.A. No. 16297 – Court of Chancery of the 
State of Delaware in and for New Castle County.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
plaintiff. 
 
J.G. Juran, et al. v. Bastion Capital Fund, L.P., et al., C.A. No. 16464 – Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County.  Testifying expert on 
behalf of defendants. 
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United Rentals, Inc. v. Rental Services, Inc. and NationsRent, Inc. – Court of Chancery 
of the State of Delaware.  Expert affidavit regarding break-up fee data on behalf of 
plaintiff. 
 
In Re: Arbitration between Sara Lee Corporation and totes Isotoner Holdings 
Corporation.  Consulting engagement on behalf of Sara Lee Corporation with regard to 
sale of the Aris/Isotoner business to totes. 
 
Sungard Recovery Services, Inc. v. Comdisco, Inc. v. Data Assurance Corporation, 
Case No. 97-WM-389 – United States District Court for the District of Colorado.  
Testifying expert (deposition) on behalf of defendant. 
 
Carol Kropinski, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, Docket No. L8886/96 – Superior Court of 
New Jersey Law Division, Camden County.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
 
In Re Sunbeam Corporation Securities Litigation  –  United States District Court, 
Southern District of Florida, 10b.5 securities action.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
defendant. 
 
LaSalle National Bank v. R.O. Perelman, et al., No. 97-645 (RRM) – United States 
District Court of Delaware, Noteholders litigation.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
defendant. 
 
Ronald Cantor, Ivan Snyder, James A. Scarpone, as Trustees of the MAFCO Litigation 
Trust v. Ronald O. Perelman, Mafco Holdings, Inc., MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., Andrews Group Inc., William C. Bevins, and Donald G. Drapkin. C.A. No. 97-586 
(KAJ). United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  Breach of fiduciary 
duty claim involving issuance of notes.  Consulting expert for defendants on remand. 
 
Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., et al., No. 98 C 7482 – United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, 10b.5 securities action.  
Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
Anthony R. Gold, PC Brand, Inc., Software Communications, Inc., v Ziff 
Communications Company, d/b/a Ziff-Davis Publishing Case No. 01 L 9518 – In the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department – Law Division – Breach of 
contract.  Testifying expert (deposition) on behalf of defendant on remand.  
 
Greenlight Capital Qualified, L.P., Greenlight Capital, L.P., and Greenlight Capital 
Offshore, Ltd., v. Emerging Communications, Inc., Case No. 16415 – Delaware 
Chancery Court –  Appraisal action.  Consulting expert on behalf of petitioners. 
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IBP, Inc., v. Tyson Foods, Inc. and Lasso Acquisition Corporation Case No. 18373 – 
Delaware Chancery Court- Breach of contract in a takeover/merger.  Consulting expert 
on behalf of defendant (Tyson Foods, Inc.). 
 
Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation Case No. 18336 NC -Delaware Chancery Court- 
Class and shareholder derivative action.  Expert affidavit on behalf of plaintiffs 
concerning value of settlement consideration.   
 
Superior National Insurance Group v. Foundation Health Systems, Inc. and Milliman & 
Robertson, Inc. Case No. CV-02-5155-PA (MLGx). Fraud and fraudulent conveyance 
action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.  
Consulting expert on behalf of defendant (Foundation Health Systems, Inc.). 
 
Analytical Surveys, Inc. Securities Litigation Case No. IP00-C-0201-M/S – United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana Indianapolis Division – 10b-5 
securities action.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
Chesapeake Corporation and Sheffield, Inc., v. Marc P. Shore, Howard M. Liebman, 
Andrew N. Shore, Leonard S. Verebay, Virginia A. Kamsky, Sharon R. Fairley, R. 
Timothy O’Donnell, Kevin J. Bannon, William P. Weidner, and Shorewood Packaging 
Corporation Case No. CV17626 NC – Delaware Chancery Court – Takeover litigation 
surrounding Chesapeake’s bid for Shorewood.  Testifying expert (deposition and trial) 
on behalf of defendants.   
 
JAS Securities LLP v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Del. Super, Ct., C.A. No. 99C-07-143 
(JSS) – In the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County – 
Class Action Complaint Non-Arbitration Case.  Expert affidavit on behalf of defendant. 
 
Alcatel Alsthom Securities Litigation MDL Docket No. 1263 – In the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Sherman Division – 10b-5 securities 
action.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P., Phil & Jana Frohlich, Phil D. Frohlich, Ira, Leroy 
Warren Brewer, and Cede & Co., v. The Coleman Company, Inc. C.A. No. 17802 NC – 
In the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware In and for New Castle County – 
appraisal action.  Consulting expert on behalf of respondent. 
 
 
Submissions to the Special Master of the September 11
th
 Victim Compensation Fund of 
2001 and to the United States Department of Justice on behalf of the Cantor Fitzgerald, 
L.P., ESpeed, Inc. and Tradespark, L.P. victims’ families.  Consulting and testifying (in 
certain individual hearings) expert on behalf of victims’ families.  
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In Re Sprint Corporation Securities Litigation. Master File No. 01-4080-DES. United 
States District Court District of Kansas. Securities class action. Consulting expert on 
behalf of defendants. 
 
Citibank, N.A. and Citibank Canada, v. Itochu International Inc., and III Holding Inc. 
f/k/a Copelco Financial Services Group, Inc., Case No. 01-CV-6007 (GBD/DF) – 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York – transferred to New 
York State Court.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
 
In Re Healthsouth Corp. ERISA Litigation. Consolidated Case No. CV-03-BE-1700-S – 
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Southern 
Division.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
In Re Healthsouth Corporation Stockholder Litigation Case No. CV-03-BE-1501-S – In 
the United States District Court Northern District of Alabama Southern Division.  
Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
In Re Williams Securities Litigation Case No. 02-CV-72H(M) – United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission In the Matter of General Mills, Inc. 
File No. C-03760-A.  Consulting expert on behalf of General Mills, Inc. 
 
In The International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce 
and In the Matter of an Arbitration BNP Paribas, Arval PHH Holdings (UK) Limited, 
Arval PHH Holdings and Avis Group Holdings, Inc. and VMS (Bermuda) Holdings 
Ltd.   Consulting expert on behalf of defendant (Avis). 
 
Fuqua Industries, Inc. Shareholder Litigation – C.A. No. 11974.  Delaware Chancery 
Court. Breach of fiduciary duty action.  Testifying expert (deposition) on behalf of 
defendants. 
 
The Litigation Trust of MDIP Inc. (Formerly known as Mosler Inc.) and its Affiliates v. 
Michel Rapoport, William A. Marquard, Thomas R. Wall, IV, Robert A. Young, III, 
and Kelso & Co., Inc. C.A. No. 03-CV-779-GMS.  United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware. Breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent transfer claim.  
Consulting expert on behalf of defendants. 
 
Donald L. Sturm; Donald L. Sturm Charitable Trust – Donald L. Sturm, TTEE; Sturm 
Family Foundation; Sturm Family Capital, LLP and Colorado Seminary v. Citigroup, 
Inc.; Citigroup global Markets, Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney; and Jack Grubman.  
NASD Arbitration Nos. 037612 & 037644.  Testifying expert (in arbitration) on behalf 
of defendants. 
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In Re Royal Ahold Securities and ERISA Litigation Case No. 03-MD-01539-CCB – 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland Northern Division.  Consulting 
expert for plaintiffs. Affidavit in support of the Plan of Allocation. 
 
Venture Industries, et al v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., successor to Morton International. Inc., 
Autoliv, Inc. and Morton International, Inc. Case No. 99-75354 – United States District 
Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division.  Lost profits/breach of contract 
action.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendants on appeal. 
 
Third Avenue Real Estate Value Fund, et al v. Butler Manufacturing Company and BSL 
Acquisition Corp. Del Ch., C.A. No. 641-N. Delaware Chancery Court Appraisal 
Action. Testifying (deposition and trial) on behalf of respondents. 
 
Solo Cup Company, v. Dennis Mehiel, as Stockholders’ Representative under the 
Merger Agreement between Solo Cup Company, Solo Acquisition Corp. and SF 
Holdings Group, Inc. Case No. 51 489 Y 01966 04 – Before the American Arbitration 
Association.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
 
In Re Chiron Shareholders Deal Litigation. Case No. RG 05-230567. Superior Court of 
the State of California for the County of Alameda. Testifying expert (deposition) on 
behalf of defendant (Chiron). 
 
In Re CMS Energy Securities Litigation. Civ. No. 02 CV 72004 (GCS). United States 
District Court Eastern District of Michigan.  Securities class action. Testifying expert 
(deposition) on behalf of plaintiffs. 
 
In Re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation. Master File No. 01 Civ. 3288 (DLC). 
United States District Court Southern District of New York.  IQ Holdings, Inc. sought 
compensation under Federal and Texas law for losses suffered on its Worldcom 
investments.  Submitted a rebuttal report on behalf of defendants Citigroup, Inc. and 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc.). 
 
URS Corporation v. The Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction 
of Beirut Central District, S.A.L., a/k/a/ Solidere.  Civil Action No. 06-415-SLR.  
United States District Court For the District of Delaware.  Testifying expert on behalf of 
plaintiff. 
 
Carpenters Health & Welfare fund, et. al., v. The Coca-Cola Company, et. al. File No. 
1:00-CV-2838-WBH.  United States District Court Northern District of Georgia Atlanta 
Division.  Securities class action.  Testifying expert (deposition) on behalf of defendant 
The Coca-Cola Company with respect to disclosure and accounting misstatement 
claims. 
 
JX 666 - p. 71 of 120
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
APPENDIX A 
DAGES,  10  
Radian International, LLC, The Lebanese Company for Development and 
Reconstruction of Beirut Central District, S.A.L. (“Solidere”), and URS Corporation. 
Case No. 14208/EC (C-14236/EC).  International Chamber of Commerce International 
Court of Arbitration.  Testifying expert on behalf of URS Corporation. 
 
In re Tyco International Ltd. Securities Litigation (including multiple opt-out cases) 
MDL Docket No. 02-1335-B. United States District Court, District of New Hampshire, 
Consulting regarding accounting restatement and audit committee issues on behalf of 
defendant.   
 
GE Funding Holdings, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, v. FGIC Corporation, C.A. No. 
4012-CC. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Injunction hearing.  
Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiff. 
 
Broadcom Corporation, et al. v. Fred B. Cox, et al. No. 4536-VSC & No. 4519-VCS.  
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Breach of fiduciary duty action 
involving anti-takeover provisions.  Consulting on behalf of plaintiff.   
 
IAC/Interactive Corp and Barry Diller v. Liberty Media Corporation, C.A. No. 3486-
VCL.  The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Injunction hearing regarding 
spin-off transactions.  Consulting expert on behalf of defendant. 
 
In Re UnitedGlobalCom Shareholders Litigation. C.A. No. 1012-VCS.  The Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (deposition) behalf of defendant 
(Liberty Media International) regarding fairness of merger consideration.  
 
VOOM HD Holdings LLC v. Echostar Satellite LLC.  Case No. 600292/08.  Supreme 
Court of the State of New York, County of New York.  Consulting expert on behalf of 
plaintiff. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Warren B. Schmidgall and David E Watson.  
Case No. 4:08-cv-00677-GAF.  United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri Western Division.  Testifying expert (deposition) on behalf of defendant 
David E. Watson. 
 
Russian Federation General Prosecutor’s Office v. M.B. Khodorkovsky and P.L. 
Lebedev , Criminal Case No. 18/432766-07. Khamovnicheskiy District Court, Moscow, 
Russia. Filed Specialist’s report and participated in trial on behalf of defendants:  M.B. 
Khodorkovsky and P.L. Lebedev. 
 
In Re The Student Loan Corporation Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 5832 - VCL.  
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Affidavit on behalf of Defendant 
Citigroup, Inc in preliminary injunction hearing. 
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Cancer Clinics of Excellence, LLC and CCE Partners, LLC v. McKesson Corporation 
and McKesson Specialty Care Distribution Joint Venture LP (Formerly Oncology 
Therapeutics Network Joint Venture, LP), Index No. 652124/2010 IAS Part 39.  
Supreme Court of the State of New York County of New York.  Affidavit on behalf of 
McKesson Corporation. 
 
Liberty Media Corporation and Liberty Media LLC v. The Bank of New York Mellon 
Trust Company, N.A., as Trustee, C.A. No.: 5702-VCL.  In the Court of Chancery of 
the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (deposition and trial) on behalf of plaintiffs. 
 
Joel Krieger v. Wesco Financial Corporation, et al, C.A. No. 6176-VCL.  In the Court 
of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (deposition) and Affidavit on 
behalf of Wesco Financial Corporation in preliminary injunction hearing. 
 
In Re Barnes and Noble Stockholders Derivative Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 
4813-CS.  The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (opening 
report, rebuttal report and deposition) on behalf of plaintiffs. 
  
In Re Rural/Metro Corporation Shareholders Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 6350-
VCL.  The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (affidavit, 
expert reports, deposition and trial testimony) on behalf of plaintiff Joanna Jervis. 
 
In Re Medco/Express Scripts Merger Litigation, Civil Action No. 11-4211(DMC)(MF).  
United States District Court, District of New Jersey.  Declaration on behalf of defendant 
Express Scripts. 
 
Kraft Foods Global, Inc. v. Starbucks Corporation, JAMS Arbitration No. 1340008345. 
Expert report on damages and deposition on behalf of respondent Starbucks. 
 
Kellogg Capital Markets LLC and Eric Rosenfeld v. Troy Group, Inc., Troy Group 
Holding Company, Inc., Patrick J. Dirk, and Brian P. Dirk.  C.A. No. 6455-CS.  The 
Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (rebuttal report and 
deposition) on behalf of defendants.       
 
In Re Feihe International, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Lead Case No. 120906911 
In the Third Judicial District Court In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah.  
Declaration on behalf of defendant Feihe International. 
 
In Re Sprint Nextel Corporation Shareholders Litigation, Consolidated Case No. 
12CV08366.  In the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas.  Consulting expert on 
valuation and deal protection claims on behalf of defendant. 
 
CommonWealth REIT, et al. v. Corvex Management LP, and Related Fund 
Management, LLC., American Arbitration Association No. 11-512-Y-276-13. 
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Testifying expert (affidavit and expert report) on behalf of claimant and counterclaim 
respondent the Trustees of CommonWealth REIT. 
 
Gregg Lapointe, et al. v. Sigma-Tau Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., In the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Montgomery County. Case No. 363433-v. Testifying expert (opening 
report and rebuttal report, deposition) on behalf of plaintiffs. 
 
Douglas M. Hayes v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., et al. C.A. No. 8885-VCL.  The Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (affidavit) on behalf of defendants 
in a preliminary injunction hearing regarding Activision’s repurchase of shares owned 
by majority shareholder Vivendi S.A. 
 
Santosh George Kottayil, et al., v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., et al, In the Superior Court 
of Arizona for Maricopa County.  Case No. CV2009-028831.  Testifying expert 
(opening report, rebuttal report, deposition and trial testimony) on behalf of defendants. 
 
Dennis Walter Bond, Sr., et al., v. Marriott International, Inc., et al., Civil Action No.: 
8:10-cv-1256-RWT.  United States District Court, District of Maryland, Greenbelt 
Division.  Testifying expert (opening report, rebuttal report, supplemental report and 
deposition) on behalf of defendants. 
 
Chris A. Davis v. 24 Hour Fitness Worldwide, Inc.  Civil Action No. 12-01370 GMS.  
In the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  Testifying expert 
(opening report and deposition) on behalf of plaintiffs. 
  
In Re Appraisal of NetSpend Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 8807-VCG.  In the Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (opening report) on behalf of 
petitioner. 
 
In Re Jefferies Group, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 8059-CS.  The Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (opening report, rebuttal report 
and deposition) on behalf of defendants. 
 
In Re Dole Food Company, Inc., Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 8703-VCL and In Re 
Appraisal of Dole Food Company, Inc., C.A. No. 9079-VCL.  The Court of Chancery 
of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (opening report, rebuttal report, deposition 
and trial testimony) on behalf of plaintiffs. 
In Re Cheniere Energy, Inc., C.A. No. 9766-VCL and In Re Cheniere Energy, Inc. 
Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 9710-VCL.  The Court of Chancery of the State of 
Delaware.  Testifying expert (report) on behalf of defendants.  
 
In Re Sauer-Danfoss, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 8396-VCL.  
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (report, deposition) 
on behalf of defendants. 
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In Re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp., Consolidated C.A. No. 10107-CB. The Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware.  Testifying expert (opening report, rebuttal report, 
deposition and trial testimony) on behalf of petitioners. 
 
In re Working Capital Arbitration between United BioSource LLC and Bracket Holding 
Corp.  Testifying expert (declaration) on behalf of seller United BioSource. 
 
TCV VI, L.P., TCV Member Fund, L.P., and Continental Investors Fund LLC v. 
TradingScreen Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10164-VCL.  The Court of Chancery of the State of 
Delaware.  Consulting expert on behalf of plaintiffs in preferred stock redemption 
dispute. 
      
In Re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 
8922-VCG.  The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. Consulting expert on 
behalf of defendants in a successful mediation resolution of a breach of fiduciary duties 
complaint concerning a controlling shareholder acquisition.  
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Case Document 
 Respondents’ Responses and Objections to Petitioners’ First Interrogatories 
SEC Filings 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 8-K, March 2, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 8-K, May 18, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Schedule 14A, April 3, 2015  
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2008 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2009  
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2012  
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2013 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-Q, January 31, 2014 
 Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015 
 HP Inc. Form 10-K, October 31, 2015 
 Meru Networks, Inc. Form 8-K, May 27, 2015 
 Motorola Solutions, Inc. Form 8-K, April 14, 2014 
 Ruckus Wireless Inc. Form 8-K, April 3, 2016 
Depositions 
 Deposition of George Boutros  
 Deposition of Michael Galvin 
 Deposition of Joakim Johansson 
 Deposition of Dominic Orr  
 Deposition Transcript of Dominic Orr in In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
C.A. No. 10765-VCL  
 Deposition of Jeff Reisenberg 
 Deposition of Dan Warmenhoven 
Analyst Reports 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Communications Equipment & Internet Security - Estimate 
Changes", JMP Securities, January 12, 2015 
  Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN: Intermediate To Long-Term Drivers Outweigh Near-
Term Concerns", Cowen & Company, January 20, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Stock Comp Risk Overblown", SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, 
January 29, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Aruba Networks, Inc", Imperial Capital, February 9, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Why Aruba is Still a Buy?", UBS, February 20, 2015 
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 "Aruba Networks, Inc", Dougherty & Company LLC, February 23, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Potential Acquisition by HP Elevates Interest in WLAN", BRG, 
February 26, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Managing the E-Rate Pause Well, Raising Target", Barclays, 
February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN: Results Beat, Operating Leverage Improves but 
Education Pause Impacts Guide", BRG, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Q4 Results", Deutsche Bank, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "F2Q15: Solid Quarter; Raise PT to $28", SunTrust Humphrey 
Robinson, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Better-than-Expected Results; E-Rate Timing influences Prudent 
Outlook", Dougherty & Company, LLC 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "2Q15 Review—Executing in a Tough Environment; Maintaining 
Our Outperform Rating and Increasing Our Price Target to $27 from $19", Imperial 
Capital, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN – Strong Execution and Possible Acquisition by HPQ – 
Raising PT to $25", FBN Securities, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid Results and Some M&A Uncertainty; Raising Estimates 
and Target", BMO Capital Markets, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid 2Q15; E-Rate Causes 3Q Uncertainty as Expected", 
Stephens, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Fed. Eases The K-12 Sting", Oppenheimer, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid results; E-Rate overhang ahead", RBC Capital Markets, 
February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "FY2Q15: Growth Outlook As Expected; Ongoing Margin 
Improvement; Not Too Late", Cowen and Company, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "FQ2 Sees Continued Execution, Strong Fed And Improving 
Margins; Reiterate OW", Piper Jaffray, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "FQ2'15 Wrap: A Beat and Raise though Guidance Range Was 
Wide Due to E-rate Uncertainty. Reit. N.", J.P. Morgan, February 27, 2015 
 Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid execution in a relatively tough environment", UBS, 
February 27, 2015 
Other Publications 
 Ciccotello, Conrad S., C. Terry Grant, and Gerry H. Grant, “Impact of Employee Stock 
Options on Cash Flow,” Financial Analysts Journal (March/April 2004)  
 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2025, January 
2015 
 Cornell, Bradford, Corporate Valuation, Business One Irwin, 1993 
 Damodaran, Aswath. (2005) Employee Stock Options (ESOPs) and Restricted Stock: 
Valuation Effects and Consequences 
 Damodaran, Aswath, Investment Valuation 3rd Edition: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2012  
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Revenue and Operating Income 
FY 2008 - FY 2014 
Total Revenue Operating Income
Note:  USD in millions. 
Source:  Exhibit 1B 
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Historical GAAP Results
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
[1] Revenue
[2] Product 148.6 161.9 221.5 334.9 434.7 496.3 595.4
[3] Support and Professional Services 29.7 37.3 45.1 61.7 82.0 103.7 133.6
[4] Total Revenue 178.3 199.3 266.5 396.5 516.8 600.0 728.9
[5] % Growth 12% 34% 49% 30% 16% 21%
[5] Cost of Revenue
[6] Product (48.1) (59.9) (77.1) (107.8) (130.4) (149.1) (187.0)
[7] Support and Professional Services (9.0) (7.9) (9.0) (14.9) (21.0) (27.4) (37.8)
[8] Total Cost of Revenue (57.1) (67.8) (86.1) (122.7) (151.4) (176.5) (224.8)
[9] Gross Profit 121.1 131.4 180.5 273.8 365.3 423.6 504.2
[10] % Growth 8% 37% 52% 33% 16% 19%
[11] % Margin 68% 66% 68% 69% 71% 71% 69%
[12] Operating Expenses
[13] Research and Development (37.4) (40.3) (51.6) (84.9) (109.4) (139.7) (169.3)
[14] Sales and Marketing (86.0) (90.2) (109.4) (154.2) (198.4) (230.8) (274.8)
[15] General and Administrative (17.7) (23.2) (33.1) (39.4) (46.8) (51.0) (60.0)
[16] Legal Settlements (19.8) (14.0) (0.3)
[17] Restructuring Expense (1.4)
[18] Acquisition Related Severance Exp. (0.2)
[19] Total Operating Expenses (141.3) (155.2) (213.9) (278.6) (354.6) (435.6) (504.4)
[20] Operating Income (20.2) (23.8) (33.4) (4.7) 10.7 (12.0) (0.3)
[21] % Growth -18% -41% 86% 326% -212% 98%
[22] % Margin -11% -12% -13% -1% 2% -2% 0%
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Historical GAAP Results
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
[23] Other Income
[24] Interest Income 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.8
[25] Other Income 2.8 1.6 0.7 (0.2)
[26] Total Other Income 4.0 1.1 0.1 3.8 2.8 1.8 0.7
[27] Income Before Income Taxes (16.2) (22.6) (33.3) (0.9) 13.6 (10.2) 0.4
[28] Income Tax (1.0) (0.8) (0.7) 71.6 (22.4) (21.4) (29.4)
[29] Net Income (17.1) (23.4) (34.0) 70.7 (8.9) (31.6) (29.0)
[30] Stock Based Compensation
[31] Cost of Revenue 0.7 1.0 1.4 3.5 5.3 6.6 8.6
[32] Research and Development 6.2 7.6 10.7 23.0 31.2 36.4 44.0
[33] Sales and Marketing 9.0 10.5 14.2 24.4 34.7 37.8 42.1
[34] General and Administrative 3.4 5.5 9.8 12.9 12.7 15.5 16.5
[35] Total Stock Based Compensation 19.3 24.6 36.1 63.8 83.9 96.2 111.2
[36] % of Revenue 11% 12% 14% 16% 16% 16% 15%
[37] Depreciation and Amortization 5.6 9.7 10.1 15.0 19.1 23.7 29.5
[38] GAAP EBITDA (14.6) (14.1) (23.3) 10.3 29.9 11.7 29.2
% of Revenue -8% -7% -9% 3% 6% 2% 4%
Sources:  Aruba Networks Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, pp. 40, 41, 68, 71.  Aruba Networks Form 10-K, July 31, 2013, pp. 38, 39, 64, 
66.  Aruba Networks Form 10-K, July 31, 2012, p. 33 and 60.  Aruba Networks Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 60.  Aruba Networks 
Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 55.
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Jan13 Apr13 Jul13 Oct13 Jan14 Apr14 Jul14 Oct14 Jan15
[1] Bookings (11/24/14) $151,729 $150,567 $188,342 $179,416 $183,693 $189,072 $229,617 $200,603 $204,016
[2] QoQ % growth (0.8%) 25.1% (4.7%) 2.4% 2.9% 21.4% (12.6%) 1.7%
[3] YoY % growth 21.1% 25.6% 21.9% 11.8% 11.1%
[4] Revenue $155,362 $147,136 $153,064 $160,927 $176,356 $188,788 $202,862 $207,821 $212,931
[5] Backlog Generated in Quarter ($3,633) $3,431 $35,278 $18,489 $7,337 $284 $26,755 ($7,218) ($8,915)
[6] Book-to-Bill Ratio 0.98 1.02 1.23 1.11 1.04 1.00 1.13 0.97 0.96
Note: USD in thousands.
Source: Aspen - Discussion Exhibits (3).xlsx, (ArubaAA0466129-49), p. 4. 
Quarterly Book-to-Bill Ratio Analysis
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Aruba’s Target and Actual Bookings
Quarterly from April 2014 to January 2015
Fiscal Quarter Planned Actual
Quarter Ending Bookings Bookings Variance
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] = [D] - [C]
[1] Q3 2014 04/30/14 191,000 189,050 (1,950)
[2] Q4 2014 07/31/14 244,300 229,613 (14,687)
[3] Q1 2015 10/31/14 205,000 200,603 (4,397)
[4] Q2 2015 01/31/15 231,000 204,016 (26,984)
[5] Total (48,018)
Notes:  USD in thousands
[C]
[D]
Q3 2014 and Q4 2014 figures from Aruba Board Book, March 11, 2014, (ArubaAA0533817-
65), p. 25
Q1 2015 and Q2 2015 figures from Aruba Board Book, March 12, 2015, (ArubaAA0535042-
117), p. 15.
Q1 2015 and Q2 2015 figures from Aruba Board Book, August 22, 2014, (ArubaAA0447167-
212), p. 13.
Q3 2014 and Q4 2014 figures from Aruba Board Book, August 22, 2014, (ArubaAA0447167-
212), p. 10.
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Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow - Replication of Barclays Forecast Prepared by HP (with Synergies)
Fiscal Year Ended October 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
[1] Revenue (Pre Synergies) 314.5 1,047.9 1,188.6 1,305.5 1,425.9 1,547.9 1,668.7 1,785.6 1,895.6 1,999.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[2] Synergies / Costs (7.8) 70.4 237.2 461.3 684.1 878.7 1,055.2 1,191.4 1,282.3 1,361.4 [21] Terminal Free Cash Flow $488.4
[3] Total Revenues 306.7 1,118.3 1,425.7 1,766.8 2,110.0 2,426.5 2,723.9 2,976.9 3,177.9 3,360.4 [22] Perpetuity Growth Rate 3.00%
[23] Future Value of Terminal Value $5,589.5
[4] EBITA (Pre Synergies) 35.8 142.9 178.0 198.5 225.6 253.1 281.6 310.7 339.9 369.1
[5] Synergies / Costs (42.3) (61.3) 54.9 157.0 203.4 244.1 281.3 310.0 329.0 345.1 [24] Present Value of Terminal Value $2,054.5
[6] EBITA (6.5) 81.6 232.9 355.5 429.0 497.2 562.9 620.7 668.9 714.3 [25] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $1,570.7
[26] Enterprise Value $3,625.2
[7] Taxes (2.9) (35.8) (81.4) (118.8) (148.3) (174.0) (197.0) (217.2) (234.1) (250.0)
[8] Tax Rate -44.7% 43.8% 35.0% 33.4% 34.6% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[27] Enterprise Value $3,625.2
[9] After Tax EBIT (9.4) 45.8 151.5 236.7 280.7 323.2 365.9 403.5 434.8 464.3 [28] Plus:  Cash $291.0
[29] Less:  Debt $0.0
[10] Plus:  Depreciation 6.2 20.3 22.6 25.5 27.8 30.2 32.6 34.9 37.0 39.0 [30] Equity Value $3,916.2
[11] Less:  Capital Expenditure (7.5) (22.3) (22.9) (25.5) (27.8) (30.2) (32.6) (34.9) (37.0) (39.0)
[12] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (3.6) 20.3 37.5 35.4 28.6 29.0 28.6 27.5 25.8 24.1 [31] Shares Outstanding 121.3
[13] Unlevered Free Cash Flow (14.3) 64.1 188.7 272.1 309.4 352.1 394.5 431.0 460.6 488.4 [32] Equity Value Per Share $32.30
[14] Valuation Date 06/30/15 [33] % of Value in Terminal Value 57%
[15] Period End Date 10/31/15 10/31/16 10/31/17 10/31/18 10/31/19 10/31/20 10/31/21 10/31/22 10/31/23 10/31/24 [34] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 7.8x
[16] Discount Period 0.17 0.83 1.83 2.83 3.83 4.83 5.83 6.83 7.83 8.83
[17] Discount Rate 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00%
[18] Discount Factor 0.98 0.91 0.81 0.73 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.46 0.41 0.37
[19] Percent of Cash Flow Available 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
[20] Discounted Cash Flow (14.0) 58.3 153.3 197.4 200.4 203.6 203.7 198.7 189.6 179.5
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0%
11.00% $3,849.1 $4,148.7 $4,533.8 $34.12 $36.57 $39.71
12.00% $3,401.8 $3,625.2 $3,904.4 $30.47 $32.30 $34.57
13.00% $3,038.3 $3,208.8 $3,417.2 $27.51 $28.90 $30.60
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow - Replication of Barclays Forecast Prepared by HP (with Synergies)
Fiscal Year Ended October 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
[1]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[2]: BARC-ARU_00033967. Tab: Synergies from H.
[3] = [1] + [2].
[4]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[5]: BARC-ARU_00033967. Tab: Synergies from H.
[6] = [4] + [5].
[7]: Barclays, Project Aspen, Board Materials, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519976, p. 11. BARC-ARU_00033967. Tab: Synergies from H.
[8]: Barclays, Project Aspen, Board Materials, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519976,  p. 11.
[9] = [6] + [7].
[10]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[11]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[12]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[13] = [9] + [10] + [11] + [12].
[14]: Barclays, Project Aspen, Board Materials, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519976, p. 11.
[15]: HP fiscal year ends 10/31.
[16]: Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of June 30, 2015.
[17]: Barclays, Project Aspen, Board Materials, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519976, p. 11.
[18] = 1 / ( 1 + [17] ) ^ [16].
[19]: Assume 100% of Cash Flow Available.
[20] = [13] * [18] * [19].
[21] = 2024 [13].
[22]: PGR of 3.0%.
[23] = [21] * ( 1 + [22] ) / ( [17] - [22] )
[24] = [23] * 2024 [18]
[25] = SUM( [20] )
[26] = [24] + [25].
[27] = [26]
[28]: Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[29]: Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[30] = [27] + [28] + [29]
[31]:  Employ the treasury method for options dilution calculation.  Barclays assumed shares outstanding of 107.72 million.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
[32] = [30] / [31].
[33] = [24] / [26].
[34] = [23] / 2024 [6].
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Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow - Replication of Barclays Forecast Prepared by HP (without Synergies)
Fiscal Year Ended October 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
[1] Revenue (Pre Synergies) 314.5 1,047.9 1,188.6 1,305.5 1,425.9 1,547.9 1,668.7 1,785.6 1,895.6 1,999.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[2] Synergies / Costs [21] Terminal Free Cash Flow $264.1
[3] Total Revenues 314.5 1,047.9 1,188.6 1,305.5 1,425.9 1,547.9 1,668.7 1,785.6 1,895.6 1,999.1 [22] Perpetuity Growth Rate 3.00%
[23] Future Value of Terminal Value $3,022.1
[4] EBITA (Pre Synergies) 35.8 142.9 178.0 198.5 225.6 253.1 281.6 310.7 339.9 369.1
[5] Synergies / Costs [24] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,110.8
[6] EBITA 35.8 142.9 178.0 198.5 225.6 253.1 281.6 310.7 339.9 369.1 [25] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $1,001.9
[26] Enterprise Value $2,112.7
[7] Taxes (12.5) (50.0) (62.3) (69.5) (79.0) (88.6) (98.6) (108.7) (119.0) (129.2)
[8] Tax Rate 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[27] Enterprise Value $2,112.7
[9] After Tax EBIT 23.3 92.9 115.7 129.0 146.6 164.5 183.0 202.0 220.9 239.9 [28] Plus:  Cash $291.0
[29] Less:  Debt $0.0
[10] Plus:  Depreciation 6.2 20.3 22.6 25.5 27.8 30.2 32.6 34.9 37.0 39.0 [30] Equity Value $2,403.7
[11] Less:  Capital Expenditure (7.5) (22.3) (22.9) (25.5) (27.8) (30.2) (32.6) (34.9) (37.0) (39.0)
[12] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (3.6) 20.3 37.5 35.4 28.6 29.0 28.6 27.5 25.8 24.1 [31] Shares Outstanding 120.6
[13] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 18.4 111.1 152.9 164.4 175.3 193.5 211.6 229.5 246.8 264.1 [32] Equity Value Per Share $19.93
[14] Valuation Date 06/30/15 [33] % of Value in Terminal Value 53%
[15] Period End Date 10/31/15 10/31/16 10/31/17 10/31/18 10/31/19 10/31/20 10/31/21 10/31/22 10/31/23 10/31/24 [34] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.2x
[16] Discount Period 0.17 0.83 1.83 2.83 3.83 4.83 5.83 6.83 7.83 8.83
[17] Discount Rate 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00%
[18] Discount Factor 0.98 0.91 0.81 0.73 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.46 0.41 0.37
[19] Percent of Cash Flow Available 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
[20] Discounted Cash Flow 18.0 101.1 124.2 119.3 113.6 111.9 109.3 105.8 101.6 97.1
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0%
11.00% $2,235.3 $2,397.3 $2,605.5 $20.94 $22.27 $23.97
12.00% $1,991.9 $2,112.7 $2,263.6 $18.94 $19.93 $21.17
13.00% $1,793.8 $1,885.9 $1,998.6 $17.31 $18.06 $18.99
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow - Replication of Barclays Forecast Prepared by HP (without Synergies)
Fiscal Year Ended October 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
[1]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[2]:  Intentionally left blank since analysis is a standalone valuation.
[3] = [1] + [2].
[4]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[5]: Intentionally left blank since analysis is a standalone valuation.
[6] = [4] + [5].
[7] = [6] * [8].
[8]: Assume constant rate of 35.0%.  See  BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H.
[9] = [6] + [7].
[10]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[11]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[12]: BARC-ARU_00033967. 2015 Stub from Tab: Aspen P&L from H. 2016 - 2024 from Tab: ARUN P&L.
[13] = [9] + [10] + [11] + [12].
[14]: Barclays, Project Aspen, Board Materials, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519976, p. 11.
[15]: HP fiscal year ends 10/31.
[16]: Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of June 30, 2015.
[17]: Barclays, Project Aspen, Board Materials, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519976, p. 11.
[18] = 1 / ( 1 + [17] ) ^ [16].
[19]: Assume 100% of Cash Flow Available.
[20] = [13] * [18] * [19].
[21] = 2024 [13].
[22]: PGR of 3.0%.
[23] = [21] * ( 1 + [22] ) / ( [17] - [22] )
[24] = [23] * 2024 [18]
[25] = SUM( [20] )
[26] = [24] + [25].
[27] = [26]
[28]: Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[29]: Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[30] = [27] + [28] + [29]
[31]:  Employ the treasury method for options dilution calculation.  Barclays assumed shares outstanding of 107.72 million.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
[32] = [30] / [31].
[33] = [24] / [26].
[34] = [23] / 2024 [6].
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 5
Broker Name Prior Target Price New Target Price
[1] Barclays $22.00 $28.00
[2] BRG $20.00 $23.00
[3] Deutsche Bank $19.00 $20.00
[4] SunTrust Robinson Humphrey $25.00 $28.00
[5] Dougherty & Company $27.00 $29.00
[6] Imperial Capital $19.00 $27.00
[7] FBN Securities $21.00 $25.00
[8] BMO Capital Markets $22.00 $26.00
[9] Stephens $25.00 $26.00
[10] Morgan Stanley $22.00 $22.00
[11] Oppenheimer $20.00 $25.00
[12] RBC Capital Markets $21.00 $23.00
[13] Cowen & Company $28.00 $34.00
[14] PiperJaffray $26.00 $27.00
[15] J.P.Morgan $20.00 $24.00
[16] UBS $25.00 $27.00
[17] Minimum $19.00 $20.00
[18] Median $22.00 $26.00
[19] Mean $22.63 $25.88
[20] Maximum $28.00 $34.00
Sources:  See sources on following page.
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Analyst Price Targets Before and After February 27, 2015
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Analyst Price Targets Before and After February 27, 2015
[9]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid 2Q15; E-Rate Causes 3Q Uncertainty as Expected", Stephens, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[1]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Managing the E-Rate Pause Well, Raising Target", Barclays, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[2]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN: Results Beat, Operating Leverage Improves but Education Pause Impacts Guide", 
BRG, February 27, 2015, p. 2
[3]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Q4 Results", Deutsche Bank, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[4]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "F2Q15: Solid Quarter; Raise PT to $28", SunTrust Humphrey Robinson, February 27, 
2015, p. 1
[5]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Better-than-Expected Results; E-Rate Timing influences Prudent Outlook", Dougherty & 
Company, LLC, p. 1
[6]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "2Q15 Review—Executing in a Tough Environment; Maintaining Our Outperform Rating 
and Increasing Our Price Target to $27 from $19", Imperial Capital, February 27, 2015, p.1 
[7]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN – Strong Execution and Possible Acquisition by HPQ – Raising PT to $25", FBN 
Securities, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[8]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid Results and Some M&A Uncertainty; Raising Estimates and Target", BMO Capital 
Markets, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[16]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid execution in a relatively tough environment", UBS, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[10]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Coping Well with K-12 Purchase Delays; HP Matters Most", Morgan Stanley, February 
27, 2015, p. 1
[11]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Fed. Eases The K-12 Sting", Oppenheimer, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[12]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid results; E-Rate overhang ahead", RBC Capital Markets, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[13]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "FY2Q15: Growth Outlook As Expected; Ongoing Margin Improvement; Not Too Late", 
Cowen and Company, February 27, 2015, p. 1
[14]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "FQ2 Sees Continued Execution, Strong Fed And Improving Margins; Reiterate OW", 
Piper Jaffray, February 27, 2015, p.1
[15]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "FQ2'15 Wrap: A Beat and Raise though Guidance Range Was Wide Due to E-rate 
Uncertainty. Reit. N.", J.P. Morgan, February 27, 2015, p. 1 
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Comparable Companies X Chart














# Company Name 1/12/2015 1/20/2015 1/29/2015 2/9/2015 2/20/2015 2/23/2015 2/4/2015 2/27/2015 03/2015 Total
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
[1] Ruckus Wireless Inc X X X X X X X X X 9
[2] Cisco Systems Inc X X X X X X X X 8
[3] Aerohive Networks Inc X X X X X X X 7
[4] Ubiquiti Networks Inc X X X X X X X 7
[5] Juniper Networks Inc. X X X X X 5
[6] Brocade X X X X X 5
[7] F5 Networks Inc X X X X 4
[8] Meru Networks Inc X X X 3
[9] Arista Networks, Inc. X X X 3
[10] Motorola Solutions Inc. X X X 3
[11] Extreme Networks Inc X X X 3
[12] Radware Limited X X 2
[13] Netgear Inc. X X 2
[14] D-Link Corporation X X 2
[15] Riverbed Technology Inc. X X 2
[16] HP Inc. X X 2
[17] A10 Networks Inc X 1
[18] Citrix X 1
[19] Adtran Inc X 1
[20] Ericsson X 1
[21] Gigamon Inc X 1
[22] Infoblox Inc X 1
[23] Polycom, Inc. X 1
[24] Alcatel Lucent X 1
[25] BroadSoft, Inc. X 1
[26] CommScope X 1
[27] NetScout Systems, Inc. X 1
[28] Xirrus X 1
[29] TP-Link X 1
[30] Huawei X 1
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Comparable Companies X Chart














# Company Name 1/12/2015 1/20/2015 1/29/2015 2/9/2015 2/20/2015 2/23/2015 2/4/2015 2/27/2015 03/2015 Total
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Notes and Sources:
[1]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Communications Equipment & Internet Security - Estimate Changes", JMP Securities, January 12, 2015, p. 3.
[2]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN: Intermediate To Long-Term Drivers Outweigh Near-Term Concerns", Cowen & Company, January 20, 2015, p. 11.
[3]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Stock Comp Risk Overblown", SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, January 29, 2015, p. 2.
[4]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Aruba Networks, Inc", Imperial Capital, February 9, 2015, p. 2.
[5]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Why Aruba is Still a Buy?", UBS, February 20, 2015, p. 4. 
[6]: Aruba Networks, Inc.,"Aruba Networks, Inc", Dougherty & Company LLC, February 23, 2015, p. 2.
[7]: Project Athens, Evercore, February 4, 2015, EVERCORE00011432, p. 19.
[8]: Project Aspen Board Materials, Barclays, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519986, p. 19.
[9]: Project Athens, Materials For Discussion, DRAFT, March 2015, ARUN000123, p. 31.
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 7
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Comparable Company Multiples
Price Per Market Total Minority Cash Enterprise GAAP EBITDA EV / GAAP EBITDA
Company Name Share Capitalization Debt Interest & ST Inv. Value LTM CY 2015E CY2016E LTM CY 2015E CY 2016E
[1] Ruckus Wireless, Inc. $11.17 $966.9 $0.0 $0.0 $193.8 $773.1 $22.5 $17.9 $26.3 34.41x 43.19x 29.40x
[2] Cisco Systems, Inc. $29.76 $151,917.0 $20,522.0 $15.0 $53,022.0 $119,432.0 $13,086.0 $13,398.4 $13,973.8 9.13x 8.91x 8.55x
[3] Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. $30.00 $2,640.0 $100.0 $0.0 $451.2 $2,288.9 $201.9 $195.1 $212.4 11.34x 11.73x 10.78x
[4] Aerohive Networks, Inc. $6.73 $314.0 $20.0 $0.0 $92.7 $241.3 ($32.9) N/A N/A
[5] Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.$12.25 $5,175.5 $1,084.4 $0.0 $1,359.4 $4,900.5 $568.9 $521.4 N/A 8.61x 9.40x
[6] F5 Networks, Inc. $127.35 $9,160.6 $0.0 $0.0 $666.5 $8,494.1 $588.7 $628.3 N/A 14.43x 13.52x
[7] Juniper Networks, Inc. $27.62 $10,905.4 $1,948.6 $0.0 $2,209.0 $10,645.0 $856.7 $954.7 $1,007.4 12.43x 11.15x 10.57x
[8] Mean 15.06x 16.32x 14.82x
[9] Median 11.88x 11.44x 10.67x
Notes:  USD in millions.
Sources:  Selection of peers from Exhibit 6.  GAAP EBITDA from FactSet.  All other figures from Capital IQ.
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Median Implied Implied Equity
EBITDA GAAP Enterprise Net Equity Shares Value
Type of Multiple Multiple EBITDA Value Debt Value Outstanding Per Share
[1] LTM 11.88x $80.8 $959.8 $291.0 $1,250.8 108.32 $11.55
[2] CY 2015E 11.44x $132.5 $1,515.9 $291.0 $1,806.9 108.32 $16.68
[3] CY 2016E 10.67x $193.5 $2,065.0 $291.0 $2,356.0 108.32 $21.75
Note:  USD in millions.  Fiscal year figures adjusted to calendar year so as to conform to multiples
Sources: Multiples from Exhibit 7.  LTM EBITDA from Capital IQ.  Estimated EBITDA from Exhibit 15.  Net Debt and Shares Outstanding 
from Exhibit 19A.
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Summary of Comparable Transactions in certain Equipment and Systems Design SIC Groups
May 18, 2005 - May 18, 2015
Target's Target Transaction
Announce Close Primary Transaction LTM Value / 
# Date Date Target Company Acquirer Company SIC Code Value EBITDA LTM EBITDA
[1] 01/22/2015 04/08/2015 Aruba Networks, Inc. HP Inc. (NYSE:HPQ) 3576 $2,651 $81 32.8x
[2] 03/02/2015 04/29/2015 Fundtech Ltd. DH Corporation 7373 $1,250 $21 59.8x
[3] 09/23/2013 11/04/2013 Riverbed Technology, Inc. Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan;
Thoma Bravo, LLC
3576 $3,866 $185 20.9x
[4] 06/26/2012 11/02/2012 Sapient Corp. Publicis Groupe SA 7373 $3,684 $176 20.9x
[5] 03/19/2012 05/01/2012 MICROS Systems, Inc. Oracle Corporation 7373 $5,262 $262 20.1x
[6] 06/13/2011 08/19/2011 OpenTable, Inc. The Priceline Group Inc. 7373 $2,613 $60 43.4x
[7] 04/25/2011 06/14/2011 Fieldglass, Inc. SAP SE 7373 $1,000 $0 -
[8] 04/06/2011 05/03/2011 Motorola Mobility Holdings, Inc. Lenovo (United States) Inc. 3663 $2,859 $190 15.0x
[9] 12/20/2010 01/28/2011 Sourcefire, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc. 7373 $2,395 $18 129.7x
[10] 12/09/2010 02/22/2011 Acme Packet, Inc. Oracle Corporation 3576 $2,045 $9 225.5x
[11] 08/30/2010 12/01/2010 General Instrument Corporation ARRIS International plc 3663 $2,510 $393 6.4x
[12] 06/02/2010 07/23/2010 Sunquest Information Systems, Inc. Roper Technologies, Inc. 7373 $1,415 $21 67.0x
[13] 06/04/2009 07/15/2009 Paradigm Ltd. Apax Partners LLP; JMI Equity 7373 $1,000 ($1) -
[14] 12/10/2006 02/16/2007 Motorola Mobility Holdings, Inc. Alphabet Inc. 3663 $12,033 $305 39.5x
[15] 01/18/2006 03/23/2006 SunGard Higher Education, Inc. Ellucian, Inc. 7373 $1,775 $0 -
[16] 01/11/2006 08/29/2006 Radiant Systems, Inc. NCR Corporation 7373 $1,242 $55 22.5x
[17] 06/13/2014 07/24/2014 Syniverse Holdings, Inc. The Carlyle Group LP 7373 $2,722 $198 13.7x
[18] 03/26/2014 05/02/2014 CommScope Holding Company, Inc. The Carlyle Group LP 3663 $4,460 $488 9.1x
[19] 01/29/2014 10/30/2014 MorphoTrust USA, LLC. Safran SA 7373 $1,588 $68 23.3x
[20] 02/04/2013 03/28/2013 Eclipsys Corporation Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. 7373 $1,288 $54 23.8x
[21] 07/30/2012 08/22/2012 Stanley, Inc. CGI Federal Inc. 7373 $1,064 $91 11.7x
[22] 08/15/2011 05/22/2012 3Com Corporation HP Inc. 3576 $3,401 $142 23.9x
[23] 08/05/2011 01/20/2012 Starent Networks LLC Cisco Systems, Inc. 3663 $2,828 $104 27.2x
[24] 07/11/2011 08/22/2011 Avocent Corporation Emerson Electric Co, 3576 $1,302 $81 16.1x
[25] 10/28/2010 01/13/2011 Perot Systems Corporation Denali Holding Inc. 7373 $4,101 $276 14.9x
[26] 05/07/2010 08/16/2010 Foundry Networks, LLC Brocade Communications Systems 3576 $2,391 $110 21.8x
[27] 10/13/2009 12/18/2009 Pelco, Inc. Schneider Electric Buildings AB 3663 $1,679 $0 -
[28] 10/06/2009 12/11/2009 Avaya Inc. Silver Lake; TPG Capital, L.P. 3663 $8,251 $637 13.0x
[29] 09/21/2009 11/03/2009 Redback Networks Inc. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson 7373 $2,068 $13 155.9x
[30] 07/21/2008 12/18/2008 Sabre Holdings Corporation Silver Lake; TPG Capital, L.P. 7373 $5,607 $419 13.4x
[31] 06/05/2007 10/26/2007 Capgemini Financial Services International Cap Gemini S.A. 7373 $1,372 $60 22.7x
[32] 12/20/2006 01/23/2007 The Reynolds and Reynolds Company The Reynolds and Reynolds Company 7373 $2,858 $161 17.8x
[33] 12/12/2006 03/30/2007 Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. Alcatel-Lucent 7373 $18,855 $1,415 13.3x
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Summary of Comparable Transactions in certain Equipment and Systems Design SIC Groups
May 18, 2005 - May 18, 2015
Target's Target Transaction
Announce Close Primary Transaction LTM Value / 
# Date Date Target Company Acquirer Company SIC Code Value EBITDA LTM EBITDA
[34] 04/02/2006 11/30/2006 Anteon International Corporation General Dynamics Corporation 7373 $2,230 $138 16.2x
[35] 12/13/2005 06/08/2006 Scientific-Atlanta, LLC Cisco Systems, Inc. 3663 $6,878 $430 16.0x
[36] 09/28/2005 01/04/2006 IDX Systems Corporation GE Healthcare Limited 7373 $1,382 $73 19.0x
[37] 06/03/2005 07/29/2005 Engility LLC L-3 Communications Holdings Inc. 7373 $2,672 $174 15.3x
Mean 36.2x
Median 20.5x
Note:  Capital IQ. USD in millions.
Screening Criteria:
1) All Transactions Announced Date:  [5/18/2005-5/18/2015]
2) Target SIC Codes: 3576 Computer communications equipment, 3663 Radio and Television communications equipment, 7373 Computer integrated systems design.
3) Transaction closed
4) M&A Transaction only.
5) Target Geographic Region in US and Canada
6) Transaction value over $1 billion.
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Median Implied Implied Equity
EBITDA GAAP Enterprise Net Equity Shares Value
Type of Multiple Multiple EBITDA Value Debt Value Outstanding Per Share
[1] LTM (GAAP) 20.45x $80.8 $1,652.2 $291.0 $1,943.2 108.32 $17.94
Note:  USD in millions.
Sources:  Multiples from Exhibit 9.  LTM EBITDA from Capital IQ.  Net Debt and Shares Outstanding from Exhibit 19A.
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Comparison of October 2014 and February 2015 Projections
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2014A 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Revenue:
[1] October 2014 Projections $729.0 $884.0 $1,096.0 $1,367.0
[2] February 2015 Projections $729.0 $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.0 $1,421.0 $1,598.0 $1,758.0
Revenue Growth Rate:
[3] October 2014 Projections 21.3% 24.0% 24.7%
[4] February 2015 Projections 19.6% 19.0% 19.0% 15.1% 12.5% 10.0%
Non-GAAP Gross Profit:
[4] October 2014 Projections $522.0 $630.0 $794.0 $995.0
[5] February 2015 Projections $522.0 $634.0 $762.0 $911.0 $1,051.0 $1,183.0 $1,301.0
Non-GAAP Gross Profit Margin:
[5] October 2014 Projections 71.6% 71.3% 72.4% 72.8%
[6] February 2015 Projections 71.6% 72.7% 73.4% 73.8% 74.0% 74.0% 74.0%
Non-GAAP Operating Income:
[7] October 2014 Projections $128.0 $190.0 $251.0 $350.0
[8] February 2015 Projections $128.0 $199.0 $245.0 $307.0 $355.0 $400.0 $440.0
Non-GAAP Operating Margin:
[9] October 2014 Projections 17.6% 21.5% 22.9% 25.6%
[10] February 2015 Projections 17.6% 22.8% 23.6% 24.9% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
Note:  USD in millions.
[1] - [10]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Schedule 14A, April 3, 2015, p. 56. 
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Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Revenue Growth Rate Estimates:  Management vs. Analysts vs. Industry  
Management Projections Analyst Median Estimate WLAN Industry
Source:  Exhibit 12B. 
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Analyst Revenue Estimates
Date Analyst 2015E 2016E 2017E
[1] 02/27/15 Barclays $862 $996 $1,120
[2] 02/27/15 BMO Capital Markets $869 $1,022
[3] 02/27/15 BRG $862 $980
[4] 02/27/15 Cowen & Company $860 $1,028 $1,184
[5] 02/27/15 Deutsche Bank Research $870 $993
[6] 02/27/15 Dougherty & Company LLC $869 $1,000
[7] 02/27/15 FBN Securities $871 $995
[8] 02/27/15 Imperial Capital $862 $1,014
[9] 02/27/15 JMP Securities $857 $970
[10] 02/27/15 JP Morgan $861 $996
[11] 02/27/15 Juda Group $860 $990
[12] 02/27/15 Morgan Stanley $859 $967
[13] 02/27/15 Oppenheimer $852 $928
[14] 02/27/15 Piper Jaffray $860 $1,000
[15] 02/27/15 RBC $868 $1,009
[16] 02/27/15 Stephens $855 $975
[17] 02/27/15 SunTrust Robinson Humphrey $861 $1,011
[18] 02/27/15 UBS $853 $962 $1,087
[19] 02/27/15 Wells Fargo $866 $1,006
[20] 02/26/15 William Blair $865 $1,013
[21] 02/26/15 Jefferies $851 $984
[22] 02/26/15 Macquarie Research $860 $988 $1,103
[23] Mean $862 $992 $1,123
[24] Median $861 $995 $1,111
Notes & Sources:  See sources on following page.
JX 666 - p. 101 of 120
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 12B
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Analyst Revenue Estimates
[5]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Q4 Results," Deutsche Bank, February 27, 2015, p. 2.
[13]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Fed. Eases The K - 12 Sting," Oppenheimer, February 27, 2015, p. 1. 
[20]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Better-Than-Expected Print and Prudent Guidance; fundamentals Strong With or Without 
M&A," William Blair, February 26, 2015, p. 1. 
[19]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN Fundamentals Appear Solid -- Attention Shifts To E-rate & HP," Wells Fargo,  
February 27, 2015, p. 1.
[17]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "F2Q15: Solid Quarter; Raise PT to $28," SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, p. 1.
[18]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid Exececution in a relatively tough environment," UBS, February 27, 2015, p. 1.
[22]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "US Federal drives strong quarter," Macquarie Research, February 26, 2015, p. 1. 
[21]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "No Comment on HP Speculation… Maintain Hold Rating," Jefferies, February 26, 2015, p. 1. 
[8]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "2Q15 Review—Executing in a Tough Environment; Maintaining Our Outperform Rating and 
Increasing Our Price Target to $27 from $19," Imperial Capital, February 27, 2015, p.1.
[4]: Aruba Networks, Inc.," FY2Q15: Growth Outlook As Expected; Ongoing Margin Improvement; Not Too Late," Cowen 
& Company, February 27, 2015, p. 1.
[1]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Managing the E-Rate Pause Well, Raising Target," Barclays, February 27, 2015, p. 2.
[2]: Aruba Networks, Inc., " Solid Results and Some M&A Uncertainty; Raising Estimates and Target,"  BMO Capital 
Markets, February 27, 2015, p. 1.
[3]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Results Beat, Operating Leverage Improves but Education Pause Impacts Guide, BRG, 
February 27, 2015,  p. 1.
[6]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Better-Than-Expected Results; E-Rate Timing influences Prudent Outlook," Dougherty & 
Company,  February 27, 2015, p. 1. 
[7]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "ARUN - Strong Execution and Possible Acquisition by HPQ - Raising PT to $24," FBN 
Securities, February 27, 2015, p. 1. 
[16]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid 2Q15; E-Rate Causes 3Q Uncertainty as Expected, " Stephens, February 27, 2015, p.1. 
[15]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Solid Results; E-Rate overhang ahead," RBC Capital Markets, February 27, 2015, p. 1. 
[9]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Comunications Infrastructure & Internet Security - Estimate Changes," JMP Securities, 
February 27, 2015, p.1.
[10]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "FQ2'15 Wrap: A Beat and Raise though Guidance Range Was Wide Due to E-rate 
Uncertainty. Reit. N.," JP Morgan, February 27, 2015, p. 3. 
[11]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Moderating Growth Though Fundamentals Solid," The Juda Group, February 27, 2015, p. 1.
[12]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Coping Well with K-12 Purchase Delays; HP Matters Most," Morgan Stanley, p. 4.
[14]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "FQ2 Sees Continued Execution, Strong Fed And Improving Margins; Reiterate OW," Piper 
Jaffray, February 27, 2015, p. 1. 
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Discounted Cash Flow - Qatalyst Model
Fiscal Year Ended July 31, Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $451.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[17] Terminal NOPAT $329.7
[2] Operating Income 105.0 244.9 307.5 355.2 399.6 439.5 [18] NOPAT Multiple 13.50x
[19] Future Value of Terminal Value $4,450.3
[3] Cash Taxes (4.2) (9.8) (76.9) (88.8) (99.9) (109.9)
[4] Tax Rate 4.0% 4.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% [20] Present Value of Terminal Value $2,645.8
[21] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $912.8
[4] NOPAT 109.2 235.1 230.6 266.4 299.7 329.7 [22] Enterprise Value $3,559
[5] Plus:  Depreciation 8.0 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[6] Less:  Capital Expenditure (8.8) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [23] Enterprise Value $3,558.6
[7] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (15.0) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [24] Plus:  Cash $291.0
[9] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 93.4 240.6 260.8 283.4 317.5 346.1 [25] Less:  Debt $0.0
[26] Equity Value $3,849.6
[10] Valuation Date 01/31/15
[11] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [27] Shares Outstanding 153.0
[12] Discount Period 0.25 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 [28] Equity Value Per Share $25.16
[13] Discount Rate 12.25% 12.25% 12.25% 12.25% 12.25% 12.25%
[14] Discount Factor 0.97 0.89 0.79 0.71 0.63 0.56
[15] Percent of Cash Flow Available 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
[16] Discounted Cash Flow 90.8 214.5 207.1 200.5 200.1
Note:  Minor differences due to rounding.
Sources:  QP00014163.xlsx and Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials For Discussion, DRAFT, March 2015 (ARUN000093-130) at 110 and 111.
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Discounted Cash Flow - Qatalyst Model Without Dilution Factor But With SBC Expense
Fiscal Year Ended July 31, Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $451.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[20] Terminal NOPAT $258.6
[2] Operating Income 105.0 244.9 307.5 355.2 399.6 439.5 [21] NOPAT Multiple 13.50x
[3] SBC Expense (24.3) (55.9) (66.6) (76.6) (86.1) (94.8) [22] Future Value of Terminal Value $3,490.8
[4] % of Revenue 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
[5] Adjusted Operating Income 80.7 189.0 240.9 278.6 313.4 344.8 [23] Present Value of Terminal Value $2,075.3
[24] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $713.1
[6] Cash Taxes (3.2) (7.6) (60.2) (69.7) (78.4) (86.2) [25] Enterprise Value $2,788
[7] Tax Rate 4.0% 4.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[7] NOPAT 77.5 181.4 180.7 209.0 235.1 258.6 [26] Enterprise Value $2,788.5
[27] Plus:  Cash $291.0
[8] Plus:  Depreciation 8.0 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 [28] Less:  Debt $0.0
[9] Less:  Capital Expenditure (8.8) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [29] Equity Value $3,079.5
[10] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (15.0) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5
[12] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 61.7 186.9 210.8 226.0 252.9 275.0 [30] Shares Outstanding 122.4
[31] Equity Value Per Share $25.16
[13] Valuation Date 01/31/15
[14] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20
[15] Discount Period 0.25 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
[16] Discount Rate 12.25% 12.25% 12.25% 12.25% 12.25% 12.25%
[17] Discount Factor 0.97 0.89 0.79 0.71 0.63 0.56
[18] Percent of Cash Flow Available 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
[19] Discounted Cash Flow 59.9 166.6 167.4 159.9 159.4
Note:  Minor differences due to rounding.
Sources:  QP00014163.xlsx and Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials For Discussion, DRAFT, March 2015 (ARUN000093-130) at 110 and 111.
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Summary of Net Outflow from ESO Exercise
2008A 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A Average 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
[1] Total Amount Spent on Share Repurchases ($2.2) ($0.5) $0.3 $0.0 ($19.9) ($86.2) ($263.0)
[2] Total Number of Shares Repurchased (0.5) (0.2) (0.0) 0.0 (1.4) (5.3) (14.7)
[3] Average Price of Share Repurchased $4.63 $2.59 $11.33 $25.13 $14.11 $16.23 $17.86
[4] Number of Shares Underlying Exercised ESO & RSA 3.5 2.9 4.9 7.6 6.5 6.3 7.7
[5] Cash Outflow to Repurchase ESO Shares $16.2 $7.6 $55.2 $190.4 $92.1 $102.0 $137.9
[6] Proceeds from ESO Exercise $6.3 $1.9 $8.1 $29.8 $21.4 $19.2 $10.4
[7] Tax Benefit from ESO Exercise $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 ($0.2) $19.8 $0.3 $15.7
[8] Cash Inflow from ESO Exercise $6.4 $2.0 $8.2 $29.6 $41.2 $19.5 $26.0
[9] Net Cash Outflow from ESO Exercise ($9.8) ($5.6) ($47.0) ($160.9) ($50.9) ($82.5) ($111.9)
[10] Net Cash Outflow as % of Revenue -5% -3% -18% -41% -10% -14% -15% -15%
[11] SBC Expense ($19.3) ($24.6) ($36.1) ($63.8) ($83.9) ($96.2) ($111.2) ($102.5) ($106.6) ($126.8) ($145.9)
[12] Revenue $178.3 $199.3 $266.5 $396.5 $516.8 $600.0 $728.9 $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7
[13] SBC Expense as % of Revenue 11% 12% 14% 16% 16% 16% 15% 14% 12% 10% 10% 10%
[14] Restricted Stock Awards Granted 3.67 1.63 1.73 4.46 7.71 7.25 4.35
[15] Stock Options Granted 2.99 10.49 5.77 1.85 0.18 0.00 0.00
[16] Total SBC Grants 6.67 12.12 7.51 6.31 7.89 7.25 4.35
Sources: Aruba Networks, Inc.  SEC Forms 10-K; Aruba Networks, Inc. internal documents.
[1]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 54. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 59. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, p. 70. 
[2]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 54. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 59. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, p. 70. 
[3] = [1] / [2].  There were no scheduled stock repurchases in 2010 and 2011. The average closing price of the common stock for those years was used in place of the average repurchase price.
[4]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 53. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 58. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, p. 68. 
[5] = [3] * [4]
[6]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 54. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 59. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, p. 70. 
[7]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 54. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 59. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, p. 70. 
[8] = [6] + [7]
[9] = [8] - [5]
[10] = [9] / [12]
[11]: Exhibit 1B. Exhibit 15.
[12]: Exhibit 1B. Exhibit 15.
[13] = [11] / [12]
[14]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 74. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 83. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, p. 91. 
[15]: Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2010, p. 74. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2011, p. 83. Aruba Networks, Inc. Form 10-K, July 31, 2014, p. 91. 
[16] = [14] + [15]
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Forecast Prepared by Aruba
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
[1] Revenue 872.0 1,038.0 1,235.4 1,420.7 1,598.3 1,758.1
[2] COGS (238.9) (275.6) (324.0) (369.4) (415.6) (457.1)
[3] Non-GAAP Gross Profit 633.1 762.5 911.4 1,051.3 1,182.7 1,301.0
[4] Total Operating Expenses (433.7) (517.5) (603.9) (696.2) (783.2) (861.5)
[5] Non-GAAP Operating Income 199.3 244.9 307.5 355.2 399.6 439.5
[6] Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3
[7] Non-GAAP EBITDA 216.1 265.3 368.6 383.7 432.4 474.8
[8] Stock Based Compensation 102.5 106.6 126.8 145.9 164.1 180.5
[9] GAAP EBITDA 113.6 158.7 241.8 237.8 268.3 294.3
[10] Capital Expenditure 20.9 23.9 67.9 30.0 32.8 35.3
[11] Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5
[11] Summary of Margins and Growth Rates
[12] Revenue Growth Rate 19.6% 19.0% 19.0% 15.0% 12.5% 10.0%
[13] Non-GAAP Gross Profit Margin 72.6% 73.5% 73.8% 74.0% 74.0% 74.0%
[14] Non-GAAP Operating Income Margin 22.9% 23.6% 24.9% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
[15] Non-GAAP EBITDA Margin 24.8% 25.6% 29.8% 27.0% 27.1% 27.0%
[16] GAAP EBITDA Margin 13.0% 15.3% 19.6% 16.7% 16.8% 16.7%
[17] SBC Margin 11.7% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3%
[18] D&A Margin 1.9% 2.0% 4.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0%
[19] Capital Expenditure Margin 2.4% 2.3% 5.5% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0%
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.
Sources:  All figures from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx except Stock Based Compensation.  Stock Based Compensation for 
FY 2015 to 2017 from BARC-ARU_00033967 at tab: "ARUN P&L."  FY 2018 to FY 2020 Stock Based Compensation 
assumes the same percentage of revenue as FY 2017.
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
Long Term Estimates of Inflation Growth and GDP Growth
As of May 18, 2015
Expected Expected
Time Real GDP Nominal GDP
Source Period Growth Rate Amount Type Growth Rate
[1] Congressional Budget Office 2020 – 2025 2.20% 2.00% PCE Index 4.20%
[2] Budget of US Government 2025 2.30% 2.30% CPI Index 4.60%
[3] Blue Chip Economic Indicators 2025 2.30% 2.30% CPI Index 4.60%
[4] Livingston Survey 2014 – 2024 2.50% 2.25% CPI Index 4.75%
[5] Energy Information Administration 2013 – 2040 2.40% 2.00% CPI Index 4.40%
[6] Mean 2.17% 4.51%
[7] Median 2.25% 4.60%
[2]:  Fiscal Year 2015, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, February 2015, p. 14 (published annually).
[3]:  Id.
[4]:  The Livingston Survey, December 12, 2014, p. 4 (published biannually).
[5]:  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2015, April 16, 2015, p. A-38 (published annually).
Expected Inflation
Growth Rate
[1]:  Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2025, January 2015, pp. 30 and 47.  PCE Index is Personal 
Consumption Expenditures (published annually).
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
2 Year Weekly Adjusted Beta of Reference Companies
Capitalization as of May 18, 2015
Price Market Total Debt / Debt / Effective Adj. Equity Beta Unlevered
Company Per Share Capitalization Debt Equity Capital Tax Rate Beta Significance Beta
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I]
[1] Ruckus Wireless, Inc. $11.17 $966.9 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% 37.3% 1.41 0.00 1.41
[2] Cisco Systems, Inc. $29.76 $151,917.0 $20,522.0 13.5% 11.9% 18.8% 1.05 0.00 0.94
[3] Ubiquiti Networks, Inc.
[4] Aerohive Networks, Inc.
[5] Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. $12.25 $5,175.5 $1,084.4 21.0% 17.3% 31.4% 1.29 0.00 1.13
[6] F5 Networks, Inc. $127.35 $9,160.6 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% 36.5% 1.10 0.00 1.10
[7] Juniper Networks, Inc. $27.62 $10,905.4 $1,948.6 17.9% 15.2% 35.0% 1.11 0.00 0.99
[8] Mean 10.5% 31.8% 1.19 1.11
[9] Median 13.5% 35.0% 1.11 1.10
[10] Aruba Networks, Inc. $18.38 $2,017.5 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% 221.4% 0.87 0.03 0.87
Notes:  All data as of May 18, 2015 except Aruba.  Aruba data as of February 24, 2015.
[A]:  Capital IQ.
[B]:  Capital IQ.
[C]:  Capital IQ.
[D] = [C] / [B]
[E] = [C] / ([B] + [C])
[F]:  Capital IQ.  As of May 18, 2015.  Aruba data as of February 24, 2015.
[G]:  Bloomberg.  Two year weekly adjusted beta as of May 18, 2015 for peers and as of February 24, 2015 for Aruba.
[H]:  Bloomberg.  If statistical significance of beta is greater than .05, company beta is excluded from mean and median.
[I] = [G] / ( 1 + [D] * ( 1 - [F] ) )
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
5 Year Weekly Adjusted Beta of Reference Companies
Capitalization as of May 18, 2015
Price Market Total Debt / Debt / Effective Adj. Equity Beta Unlevered
Company Per Share Capitalization Debt Equity Capital Tax Rate Beta Significance Beta
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I]
[1] Ruckus Wireless, Inc.
[2] Cisco Systems, Inc. $29.76 $151,917.0 $20,522.0 13.5% 11.9% 18.8% 1.06 0.00 0.95
[3] Ubiquiti Networks, Inc.
[4] Aerohive Networks, Inc.
[5] Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. $12.25 $5,175.5 $1,084.4 21.0% 17.3% 31.4% 1.21 0.00 1.06
[6] F5 Networks, Inc. $127.35 $9,160.6 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% 36.5% 1.40 0.00 1.40
[7] Juniper Networks, Inc. $27.62 $10,905.4 $1,948.6 17.9% 15.2% 35.0% 1.33 0.00 1.19
[8] Mean 13.1% 30.4% 1.25 1.15
[9] Median 15.7% 33.2% 1.27 1.12
[10] Aruba Networks, Inc. $18.38 $2,017.5 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% 221.4% 1.41 0.00 1.41
Notes:  All data as of May 18, 2015 except Aruba.  Aruba data as of February 24, 2015.  Aerohive is excluded due to insufficient data points.
[A]:  Capital IQ.
[B]:  Capital IQ.
[C]:  Capital IQ.
[D] = [C] / [B]
[E] = [C] / ([B] + [C])
[F]:  Capital IQ.  As of May 18, 2015.  Aruba data as of  February 24, 2015.
[G]:  Bloomberg.  Five year weekly adjusted beta as of May 18, 2015 for peers and as of February 24, 2015 for Aruba.
[H]:  Bloomberg.  If statistical significance of beta is greater than .05, company beta is excluded from mean and median.
[I] = [G] / ( 1 + [D] * ( 1 - [F] ) )
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Aruba Networks, Inc.
5 Year Monthly Adjusted Beta of Reference Companies
Capitalization as of May 18, 2015
Price Market Total Debt / Debt / Effective Adj. Equity Beta Unlevered
Company Per Share Capitalization Debt Equity Capital Tax Rate Beta Significance Beta
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] [H] [I]
[1] Ruckus Wireless, Inc.
[2] Cisco Systems, Inc. $29.76 $151,917.0 $20,522.0 13.5% 11.9% 18.8% 1.22 0.00 1.10
[3] Ubiquiti Networks, Inc.
[4] Aerohive Networks, Inc.
[5] Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. $12.25 $5,175.5 $1,084.4 21.0% 17.3% 31.4% 1.07 0.00 0.94
[6] F5 Networks, Inc. $127.35 $9,160.6 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% 36.5% 1.59 0.00 1.59
[7] Juniper Networks, Inc. $27.62 $10,905.4 $1,948.6 17.9% 15.2% 35.0% 1.54 0.00 1.38
[8] Mean 13.1% 30.4% 1.36 1.25
[9] Median 15.7% 33.2% 1.38 1.24
[10] Aruba Networks, Inc. $18.38 $2,017.5 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% 221.4% 1.46 0.00 1.46
Notes:  All data as of May 18, 2015 except Aruba.  Aruba data as of February 24, 2015.
[A]:  Capital IQ.
[B]:  Capital IQ.
[C]:  Capital IQ.
[D] = [C] / [B]
[E] = [C] / ([B] + [C])
[F]:  Capital IQ.  As of May 18, 2015.  Aruba data as of  February 24, 2015.
[G]:  Bloomberg.  Five year monthly adjusted beta as of May 18, 2015 for peers and as of February 24, 2015 for Aruba.
[H]:  Bloomberg.  If statistical significance of beta is greater than .05, company beta is excluded from mean and median.
[I] = [G] / ( 1 + [D] * ( 1 - [F] ) )
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Source Date Beta Estimate Low Mid High
Dages Calculated WACCs
[1] Aruba 2 Yr. Weekly, Adj. 0.87 8.17%
[2] Aruba 5 Yr. Weekly, Adj. 1.41 11.52%
[3] Aruba 5 Yr. Monthly, Adj. 1.46 11.81%
[4] Mean 10.50%
[5] Median 11.52%
[6] Industry 2 Year Weekly Mean Beta 05/18/15 1.11 9.67%
[7] Industry 2 Year Weekly Median Beta 05/18/15 1.10 9.58%
[8] Industry 5 Year Weekly Mean Beta 05/18/15 1.15 9.89%
[9] Industry 5 Year Weekly Median Beta 05/18/15 1.12 9.73%
[10] Industry 5 Year Monthly Mean Beta 05/18/15 1.25 10.52%




[14] Barclays 02/27/15 11.00% 12.00% 13.00%
[15] Evercore 02/04/15 11.00% 12.00% 13.00%
[16] Qatalyst 03/2015 10.50% 12.25% 14.00%
[17] Mean 10.83% 12.08% 13.33%
[18] Median 11.00% 12.00% 13.00%
Analysts
[19] Deutsche Bank 02/26/15 12.00%
[20] BRG 02/26/15 12.00%
[21] Mean 12.00%
[22] Median 12.00%
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[4] = AVERAGE( [1] : [3] )







[12] = AVERAGE( [6] : [11] )
[13] = MEDIAN( [6] : [11] )
[14]: Project Aspen Board Materials, Barclays, February 27, 2015, ArubaAA0519986, p. 19.
[15]: Project Athens, Evercore, February 4, 2015, EVERCORE00011432, p. 19.
[16]: Project Athens, Materials For Discussion, DRAFT, March 2015, ARUN000116, p. 24.
[17] = AVERAGE( [14] : [16] )
[18] = MEDIAN( [14] : [16] )
[19]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Q4 Results", Deutsche Bank, February 27, 2015, p. 4.
[21] = AVERAGE( [19] : [20] )
[22] = MEDIAN( [19] : [20] )
[20]: Aruba Networks, Inc., "Potential Acquisition by HP Elevates Interest in WLAN", BRG, February 26, 2015, p. 6.
Notes & Sources:  Dages Calculated WACCs assume risk-free rate of 2.75% and equity risk premium of 6.21%. Yield of 20-
year U.S. Treasury constant maturity as of May 18, 2015.  Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).  Supply Side Equity Risk 
Premium as of December 31, 2014.  Duff & Phelps, 2015 Valuation Handbook, Guide to Cost of Capital.
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Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow
Fiscal Year Ended July 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $197.8
[2] EBITDA 113.6 158.7 241.8 237.8 268.3 294.3 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,463.3
[4] EBIT 96.9 138.3 180.6 209.3 235.5 259.0
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,507.9
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (29.1) (41.5) (54.2) (62.8) (70.6) (77.7) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $607.2
[6] After Tax EBIT 67.8 96.8 126.5 146.5 164.8 181.3 [23] Enterprise Value $2,115.1
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $2,115.1
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 61.9 102.3 156.6 163.6 182.6 197.8 [26] Less:  Debt $0.0
[27] Equity Value $2,406.1
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.2
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $19.85
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 71%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.4x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 12.4 95.1 131.1 123.4 124.1 121.1
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $2,147.5 $2,254.4 $2,376.0 $20.12 $20.99 $21.99
11.00% $2,022.0 $2,115.1 $2,220.2 $19.09 $19.85 $20.71
11.50% $1,910.2 $1,991.8 $2,083.4 $18.18 $18.84 $19.59
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow
[1]:  Exhibit 15.
[2]:  Exhibit 15.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 
2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy
Fiscal Year Ended July 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $983.3 $1,108.8 $1,241.9 $1,378.5 $1,516.3 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $190.9
[2] EBITDA 120.1 166.3 244.8 239.4 264.9 284.5 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,377.8
[4] EBIT 103.3 145.9 183.7 210.9 232.1 249.2
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,455.6
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (31.0) (43.8) (55.1) (63.3) (69.6) (74.8) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $609.8
[6] After Tax EBIT 72.3 102.2 128.6 147.6 162.5 174.5 [23] Enterprise Value $2,065.4
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $2,065.4
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 66.4 107.6 158.8 164.7 180.3 190.9 [26] Less:  Debt $0.0
[27] Equity Value $2,356.4
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.2
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $19.45
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 70%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.4x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 13.3 100.0 132.9 124.2 122.5 116.9
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $2,096.9 $2,200.0 $2,317.4 $19.70 $20.55 $21.51
11.00% $1,975.6 $2,065.4 $2,166.9 $18.71 $19.45 $20.28
11.50% $1,867.4 $1,946.2 $2,034.6 $17.83 $18.47 $19.19
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 19B
Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy
[1]:  FY 2015 from Exhibit 15.  Assume 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 growth rates of: 12.76%, 12.76%, 12.00%, 11.00%, and 10.00%, respectively.
[2]:  Exhibit 15.  Assume same Non-GAAP EBITDA margin as Exhibit 15, but subtracts SBC disclosed in Proxy, p. 57.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx.
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 
2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 19C
Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections
Fiscal Year Ended July 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $983.3 $1,108.8 $1,241.9 $1,378.5 $1,516.3 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $169.4
[2] EBITDA 113.6 150.3 217.0 207.9 231.4 253.8 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,110.4
[4] EBIT 96.9 130.0 155.9 179.4 198.6 218.5
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,291.9
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (29.1) (39.0) (46.8) (53.8) (59.6) (65.6) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $536.5
[6] After Tax EBIT 67.8 91.0 109.1 125.6 139.0 153.0 [23] Enterprise Value $1,828.4
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $1,828.4
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 61.9 96.4 139.3 142.6 156.8 169.4 [26] Less:  Debt $0.0
[27] Equity Value $2,119.4
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.1
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $17.51
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 71%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.3x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 12.4 89.6 116.6 107.6 106.5 103.7
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $1,856.2 $1,947.8 $2,052.0 $17.73 $18.48 $19.34
11.00% $1,748.6 $1,828.4 $1,918.4 $16.85 $17.51 $18.24
11.50% $1,652.7 $1,722.7 $1,801.1 $16.07 $16.64 $17.28
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 19C
Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections
[1]:  FY 2015 from Exhibit 15.  Assume 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 growth rates of: 12.76%, 12.76%, 12.00%, 11.00%, and 10.00%, respectively.
[2]:  Exhibit 15.  Assume same EBITDA margin as Exhibit 15.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx.
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 
2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 19D
Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow with SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy
Fiscal Year Ended July 31, Inputs
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $236.6
[2] EBITDA 120.1 180.3 282.6 287.7 324.4 349.8 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,947.2
[4] EBIT 103.3 159.9 221.5 259.2 291.6 314.5
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,804.1
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (31.0) (48.0) (66.4) (77.8) (87.5) (94.4) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $722.9
[6] After Tax EBIT 72.3 112.0 155.0 181.4 204.1 220.2 [23] Enterprise Value $2,527.0
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $2,527.0
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 66.4 117.4 185.2 198.5 221.9 236.6 [26] Less:  Debt $0.0
[27] Equity Value $2,818.0
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.4
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $23.22
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 71%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.4x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 13.3 109.1 155.1 149.7 150.8 144.9
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $2,565.8 $2,693.6 $2,839.1 $23.53 $24.57 $25.76
11.00% $2,415.6 $2,527.0 $2,652.7 $22.31 $23.22 $24.24
11.50% $2,281.8 $2,379.5 $2,489.0 $21.22 $22.01 $22.91
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT 19D
Aruba Networks, Inc. DO NOT DELETE
Discounted Cash Flow with SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy
[1]:  Exhibit 15.
[2]:  Exhibit 15.  Assume same Non-GAAP EBITDA margin as Exhibit 15, but subtracts SBC disclosed in Proxy, p. 57.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 
2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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